Extending choreography with business contract constraints

Business contracts play a central role in governing commercial interactions between organizations. It is increasingly recognized that business contract conditions need to be closely linked to internal and external business processes, both to reduce the risk of contract violations and to ensure compliance with legislative regimes. Recent research has proposed contract languages allowing the specification of obligations, permissions and prohibitions in business contracts. Business processes that cross-organizational boundaries can be specified in choreography and coordination languages but these do not provide appropriate abstractions for contract constraints. In this paper, we examine the transformation of contract constraints in a business contract language into expressions in a choreography language. An example cross-organizational process is presented, along with a specification of the process in a choreography language and a specification of a set of contract conditions for the process in a business contract language. The contract terms are then translated into choreography expressions that govern the process to ensure compliance. Subsequent discussion explores a number of business and technology issues related to the results. We conclude that cross-organizational business processes can be monitored and enforced according to business contract specifications through the transformation of a contract definition to constraints on process behavior.

Economic Incentives to Conserve Wildlife on Private Lands: Analysis and Policy

Some believe that provision of private property rights in wildlife on private land provides a powerful economic incentive for nature conservation because it enables property owners to market such wildlife or its attributes. If such marketing is profitable, private landholders will conserve the wildlife concerned and its required habitat. But land is not always most profitably used for exploitation of wildlife, and many economic values of wildlife (such as non-use economic values) cannot be marketed. The mobility of some wildlife adds to the limitations of the private-property approach. While some species may be conserved by this approach, it is suboptimal as a single policy approach to nature conservation. Nevertheless, it is being experimented with, in the Northern Territory of Australia where landholders had a possibility of harvesting on their properties a quota of eggs and chicks of red-tailed black cockatoos for commercial sale. This scheme was expected to provide an incentive to private landholders to retain hollow trees essential for the nesting of these birds but failed. This case and others are analysed. Despite private-property failures, the long-term survival of some wildlife species depends on their ability to use private lands without severe harassment, either for their migration or to supplement their available resources, for example, the Asian elephant. Nature conservation on private land is often a useful, if not essential, supplement to conservation on public lands. Community and public incentives for such conservation are outlined.

Incentives and standards in agency contracts

This paper studies the structure of state-contingent contracts in the presence of moral hazard and multitasking. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of multitasking to lead to fixed payments instead of incentive schemes are identified. It is shown that the primary determinant of whether multitasking leads to higher or lower powered incentives is the role that noncontractible outputs play in helping the agent deal with the production risk associated with the observable and contractible outputs. When the noncontractible outputs are risk substitutes and are socially undesirable, standards are never optimal. If the noncontractible outputs are socially desirable, standards are never optimal if the noncontractible outputs play a risk-complementary role.

Effects of psychological contract breach on performance of IT employees: The mediating role of affective commitment

In this study, we investigated the relationships between psychological contract breach, affective commitment, and two types of employee performance (i.e. civic virtue behaviour and in-role performance). It was predicted that an experience of contract breach can severely hurt the affective commitment of the employees and this, in turn, results in poor in-role performance and less civic virtue behaviours. Results revealed that affective commitment had differential mediating effects on the two types of employee performance. That is, affective commitment mediated the relationship between breach and self-reported and supervisor-rated civic virtue, but not the relationship between breach and in-role performance.

Workplace familism and psychological contract breach in the Philippines

The present study addresses the call for theory-based investigations on workplace familism. It contributes to the literature by proposing and testing the moderating role of workplace familism between psychological contract breach and civic virtue behaviour. We surveyed 267 full-time employees and found main effects of both types of workplace familism (i.e. workplace organisational and workplace supervisor familism) and breach of relational obligations on civic virtue behaviour. Workplace supervisor familism also moderated the relationship between breach and civic virtue behaviour, with the negative relationship between breach and civic virtue behaviour stronger when workplace supervisor familism was high. This suggests that employees with a high level of workplace supervisor familism may feel a sense of betrayal and, therefore, respond more negatively to contract breach. Implications for practice and directions for future research are discussed.

The role of management incentives in successful information systems development and implementation

Because organizations are making large investments in Information systems (IS), efficient IS project management has been found critical to success. This study examines how the use of incentives can improve the project success. Agency theory is used to: identify motivational factors of project success, help the IS owners to understand to what extent management incentives can improve IS development and implementation (ISD/I). The outcomes will help practitioners and researchers to build on theoretical model of project management elements which lead to project success. Given the principal-agent nature of most significant scale of IS development, insights that will allow for greater alignment of the agent’s goals with those of the principal through incentive contracts, will serve to make ISD/I both more efficient and more effective, leading to more successful IS projects.