Concurreny based transition refinement for the verification of distributed algorithms

We suggest a new notion of behaviour preserving transition refinement based on partial order semantics. This notion is called transition refinement. We introduced transition refinement for elementary (low-level) Petri Nets earlier. For modelling and verifying complex distributed algorithms, high-level (Algebraic) Petri nets are usually used. In this paper, we define transition refinement for Algebraic Petri Nets. This notion is more powerful than transition refinement for elementary Petri nets because it corresponds to the simultaneous refinement of several transitions in an elementary Petri net. Transition refinement is particularly suitable for refinement steps that increase the degree of distribution of an algorithm, e.g. when synchronous communication is replaced by asynchronous message passing. We study how to prove that a replacement of a transition is a transition refinement.

Specification and Evaluation of Safety Properties in a Component-Based Software Engineering Process

Over the past years, component-based software engineering has become an established paradigm in the area of complex software intensive systems. However, many techniques for analyzing these systems for critical properties currently do not make use of the component orientation. In particular, safety analysis of component-based systems is an open field of research. In this chapter we investigate the problems arising and define a set of requirements that apply when adapting the analysis of safety properties to a component-based software engineering process. Based on these requirements some important component-oriented safety evaluation approaches are examined and compared.

MDA-based re-engineering with Object-Z

This paper describes a practical application of MDA and reverse engineering based on a domain-specific modelling language. A well defined metamodel of a domain-specific language is useful for verification and validation of associated tools. We apply this approach to SIFA, a security analysis tool. SIFA has evolved as requirements have changed, and it has no metamodel. Hence, testing SIFA’s correctness is difficult. We introduce a formal metamodelling approach to develop a well-defined metamodel of the domain. Initially, we develop a domain model in EMF by reverse engineering the SIFA implementation. Then we transform EMF to Object-Z using model transformation. Finally, we complete the Object-Z model by specifying system behavior. The outcome is a well-defined metamodel that precisely describes the domain and the security properties that it analyses. It also provides a reliable basis for testing the current SIFA implementation and forward engineering its successor.