43 resultados para LAND labels
Resumo:
The area of private land suitable and available for growing hoop pine (Araucaria cunninghamii) on the Atherton Tablelands in North Queensland was modelled using a geographic information system (GIS). In Atherton, Eacham and Herberton shires, approximately 64,700 ha of privately owned land were identified as having a mean annual rainfall and soil type similar to Forestry Plantations Queensland (FPQ) hoop pine growth plots with an approximate growth rate of 20 m3 per annum. Land with slope of over 25° and land covered with native vegetation were excluded in the estimation. If land which is currently used for high-value agriculture is also excluded, the net area of land potentially suitable and available for expansion of hoop pine plantations is approximately 22,900 ha. Expert silvicultural advice emphasized the role of site preparation and weed control in affecting the long-term growth rate of hoop pine. Hence, sites with less than optimal fertility and rainfall may be considered as being potentially suitable for growing hoop pine at a lower growth rate. The datasets had been prepared at various scales and differing precision for their description of land attributes. Therefore, the results of this investigation have limited applicability for planning at the individual farm level but are useful at the regional level to target areas for plantation expansion.
Resumo:
A modelling framework is developed to determine the joint economic and environmental net benefits of alternative land allocation strategies. Estimates of community preferences for preservation of natural land, derived from a choice modelling study, are used as input to a model of agricultural production in an optimisation framework. The trade-offs between agricultural production and environmental protection are analysed using the sugar industry of the Herbert River district of north Queensland as an example. Spatially-differentiated resource attributes and the opportunity costs of natural land determine the optimal tradeoffs between production and conservation for a range of sugar prices.
Resumo:
As in the standard land assembly problem, a developer wants to buy two adjacent blocks of land belonging to two different owners. The value of the two blocks of land to the developer is greater than the sum of the individual values of the blocks for each owner. Unlike the land assembly literature, however, our focus is on the incentive that each lot owner has to delay the start of negotiations, rather than on the public goods nature of the problem. An incentive for delay exists, for example, when owners perceive that being last to sell will allow them to capture a larger share of the joint surplus from the development. We show that competition at point of sale can cause equilibrium delay, and that cooperation at point of sale will eliminate delay. This suggests that strategic delay is another source for the inefficient allocation of land, in addition to the public-good type externality pointed out by Grossman and Hart [Bell Journal of Economics 11 (1980) 42] and O'Flaherty [Regional Science and Urban Economics 24 (1994) 287]. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.