John Waldridge, The Leaven of the Ancients: Suhrawardi and the Heritage of the Greeks, SUNY Series in Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). Pp. 323

In the Leaven of the Ancients, John Walbridge studies the appropriation of non–Peripatetic philosophical ideas by an anti–Aristotelian Islamic philosopher, Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi (d. 1191). He proposes a comprehensive explanation of the origin of Suhrawardi's philosophical system, a revival of the “wisdom of the Ancients” and its philosophical affiliations “grounded” in Greek philosophy (p. xiii). Walbridge attempts to uncover the reasons for Suhrawardi's rejection of the prevailing neo–Aristotelian synthesis in Islamic philosophy, Suhrawardi's knowledge and understanding of non–Aristotelian Greek philosophy, the ancient philosophers Suhrawardi was attempting to follow, the relationship between Suhrawardi's specific philosophical teachings (logic, ontology, physics, and metaphysics), and his understanding of non–Aristotelian ancient philosophy and the relationship between Suhrawardi's system and the major Greek philosophers, schools, and traditions—in particular the Presocratics, Plato, and the Stoics (p. 8). Copyright © 2003 Cambridge University Press

How far have reforms gone in Islam?

The encounter of East and West has initiated a period of reforms in Muslim societies. Some of the legal reforms enacted by premodern and modem Muslim states have been hailed as victories for women's rights in Islam. A historical and comparative perspective on the issue reveals that this is far from being true. Reforms constitute a far more complex issue. In many Muslim countries, Islamic law remained the main reference in matters pertaining to family and personal laws. To this day, women's rights remain a sensitive issue. A look at some modem Muslim legislations regarding divorce and polygamy illustrates both the tension that exists between the duties of modem states to uphold women's rights and their alleged Islamic principles and the tension that exists between state and religion. Paradoxically, recent developments in Iran illustrate aptly that some sort of reforms of family laws may be envisioned within the strictures of an Islamic society where Islamic law rules. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Western Images of Islam, 1700-1900

This paper traces fluctuating attitudes to Islam and its Prophet, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth. Western perceptions, as revealed by writers of the period, encyclopaedias, biographies and commentaries, were sometimes sympathetic, sometimes dismissive; sometimes celebrating Islam's piousness; sometimes accusing it of fraud. Sometimes Islam is seen as benign; sometimes its violence is seen as endemic. Often the cultural biases of western observers are obvious: the west is progressive and historically dominant, the east (and its cultural accoutrements) is degenerate and over-zealous. But we ought not judge religions or cultures by their worst manifestations alone. Oriental societies were never just Islamic or traditional. They comprise not only those who perpetuate oppressive practices towards women but also modernizers who seek change.

Irja' ila Nafsika: Suhraward's apperception of the self in light of Avicenna

Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d.687/1191) proposed a theory of apperception that constitutes the core of his “illuminative” epistemology. His theory of apperception purports to account for the soul’s immediate, reflexive, and unmediated knowledge of its own essence. Apperception may be defined as the direct experience the soul has of its essence. A closer examination of the Avicennan tradition (Avicenna died in 420/1037) reveals the existence of a number of arguments for the demonstration of an apperception of the self/soul similar to the arguments Suhrawardī later proposes. Contrary to admitted views, Avicenna had tackled issues related to the soul’s apperception, a type of perception distinct from the soul’s intellection of its essence. Avicenna alluded to the existence of a mode of perception specific to the soul that would guarantee both the soul’s unity and its personal identity. This apperception is defined as an unmediated presence of the soul to itself. These elements recur in Suhrawardī’s theory of apperception and numerous versions of Avicenna’s arguments for the demonstration of the presential nature of apperception