Manipulation in U.S. REIT Investment Performance Evaluation: Empirical Evidence

We investigate whether Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) managers actively manipulate performance measures in spite of the strict regulation under the REIT regime. We provide empirical evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis. Specifically, manipulation strategies may rely on the opportunistic use of leverage. However, manipulation does not appear to be uniform across REIT sectors and seems to become more common as the level of competition in the underlying property sector increases. We employ a set of commonly used traditional performance measures and a recently developed manipulation-proof measure (MPPM, Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch (2007)) to evaluate the performance of 147 REITs from seven different property sectors over the period 1991-2009. Our findings suggest that the existing REIT regulation may fail to mitigate a substantial agency conflict and that investors can benefit from evaluating return information carefully in order to avoid potentially manipulative funds.

An Empirical Examination of the Impacts from Termination of a Performance-Based Incentive Plan

This paper reports on the financial impacts from the termination of a pay for performance plan for the salesforce at a retail establishment. Using monthly panel data spanning more than eight years for 15 outlets of a major retailer, this study documents that store-level sales and operating profits decrease after the incentive plan is terminated. Individual performance data are then investigated to help identify the role of effort and selection effects in explaining the documented decrease. The analysis of the individual employee sales data reveals that virtually all of the declining store level sales can be explained by selection effects.