An Empirical Analysis of Continuing Improvements Following the Implementation of a Performance-Based Compensation Plan

Performance improvements subsequent to the implementation of a pay-for-performance plan can result because more productive employees self-select into the firm (selection effect) and/or because employees allocate effort to become more effective (effort effect). We analyze individual performance data for 3,776 sales employees of a retail firm to evaluate these alternative sources of continuing performance improvement. The incentive plan helps the firm attract and retain more productive sales employees, and motivates these employees to further improve their productivity. In contrast, the less productive sales employees’ performance declines before they leave the firm.

An Empirical Examination of the Impacts from Termination of a Performance-Based Incentive Plan

This paper reports on the financial impacts from the termination of a pay for performance plan for the salesforce at a retail establishment. Using monthly panel data spanning more than eight years for 15 outlets of a major retailer, this study documents that store-level sales and operating profits decrease after the incentive plan is terminated. Individual performance data are then investigated to help identify the role of effort and selection effects in explaining the documented decrease. The analysis of the individual employee sales data reveals that virtually all of the declining store level sales can be explained by selection effects.