The Impact of Supervisory Monitoring On High-End Retail Sales Productivity

Based on a two-stage analysis of a panel of data on 12 outlets of a high-end retailer for 24 months, we investigate how the level of supervisory monitoring affects retail sales productivity. In the first stage, we use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to compute the relative productivity of retail outlets in using their labor and capital resources to generate store sales. In the second stage, we regress the logarithm of DEA scores on contextual variables to obtain consistent estimators of the impact of contextual variables on productivity (Banker and Natarajan in Operation Research 56:48-58, 2008). Contrary to agency theoretic prediction that supervisory monitoring leads to an increase in retail sales productivity, our empirical results indicate that the higher the level of supervisory monitoring, the lower is the retail sales productivity for high-end retail outlets.

An Empirical Examination of the Impacts from Termination of a Performance-Based Incentive Plan

This paper reports on the financial impacts from the termination of a pay for performance plan for the salesforce at a retail establishment. Using monthly panel data spanning more than eight years for 15 outlets of a major retailer, this study documents that store-level sales and operating profits decrease after the incentive plan is terminated. Individual performance data are then investigated to help identify the role of effort and selection effects in explaining the documented decrease. The analysis of the individual employee sales data reveals that virtually all of the declining store level sales can be explained by selection effects.