An Empirical Analysis of Continuing Improvements Following the Implementation of a Performance-Based Compensation Plan

Performance improvements subsequent to the implementation of a pay-for-performance plan can result because more productive employees self-select into the firm (selection effect) and/or because employees allocate effort to become more effective (effort effect). We analyze individual performance data for 3,776 sales employees of a retail firm to evaluate these alternative sources of continuing performance improvement. The incentive plan helps the firm attract and retain more productive sales employees, and motivates these employees to further improve their productivity. In contrast, the less productive sales employees’ performance declines before they leave the firm.

The Impact of Supervisory Monitoring On High-End Retail Sales Productivity

Based on a two-stage analysis of a panel of data on 12 outlets of a high-end retailer for 24 months, we investigate how the level of supervisory monitoring affects retail sales productivity. In the first stage, we use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to compute the relative productivity of retail outlets in using their labor and capital resources to generate store sales. In the second stage, we regress the logarithm of DEA scores on contextual variables to obtain consistent estimators of the impact of contextual variables on productivity (Banker and Natarajan in Operation Research 56:48-58, 2008). Contrary to agency theoretic prediction that supervisory monitoring leads to an increase in retail sales productivity, our empirical results indicate that the higher the level of supervisory monitoring, the lower is the retail sales productivity for high-end retail outlets.