Do Individuals or Firms Matter More? The Case of Patent Generation

This paper studies the relative importance of individual inventors’ human capital and firms’ organizational capital in promoting a firm’s innovation output. We decompose the variation in innovation output into inventor- and firm-specific components. Inventors’ human capital is about 13 times as important as firms’ organizational capital in explaining a firm’s innovation performance in terms of patent counts and citations, while inventors’ human capital is only about the same as important when explaining the firm’s innovation styles in terms of patent exploratory and exploitive scores. In the cross section, inventors contribute more to innovation output when they are better networked, in firms with higher inventor mobility, in industries in which innovation is more difficult to achieve, and in publicly traded firms. Additional tests suggest that our main findings continue to hold after accounting for inventors’ endogenous moving. This paper highlights the importance of individual inventors in enhancing firm innovation and sheds new light on the theory of the firm.

Evaluating Form and Functionality of Pay-For-Performance Plans: The Relative Incentive and Sorting Effects of Merit Pay, Bonuses, and Long-Term Incentives

Using two-year longitudinal data from a large sample of US employees from a service-related organization, the present study investigates the relative effects of three forms of pay-for-performance plans on employees’ job performance (incentive effects) and voluntary turnover (sorting effects). The study differentiates between three forms of pay: merit pay, individual-based bonuses, and long-term incentives. By definition, these PFP plans have different structural elements that distinguish them from each other (i.e., pay plan form) and different characteristics (functionality), such as the degree to which pay and performance are linked and the size of the rewards, which can vary both within and across plan types. Our results provide evidence that merit raises have larger incentive and sorting effects than bonuses and long-term incentives in multi-PFP plan environments where the three PFP plans are operating simultaneously. Only merit pay has both incentive and sorting effects among the three PFP plans. The implications for the PFP-related theory, as well as for the design and implementation of PFP plans, are discussed.