Asset Management and Investment Banking

We find evidence that conflicts of interest are pervasive in the asset management business owned by investment banks. Using data from 1990 to 2008, we compare the alphas of mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional funds operated by investment banks and non-bank conglomerates. We find that, while no difference exists in performance by fund type, being owned by an investment bank reduces alphas by 46 basis points per year in our baseline model. Making lead loans increases alphas, but the dispersion of fees across portfolios decreases alphas. The economic loss is $4.9 billion per year.

Short-term Trading in Long-term Funds: Implications for Financial Managers

Most hospitality firms do not consider managing stock portfolios to be a main part of their operations. They are in the service business, using their real assets and the services provided by employees to create valuable experiences for guests. However, the need to focus on stock investments arises through those employees. Employees consistently rank benefits, including retirement benefits, among the top five contributors to job satisfaction and as a key consideration in accepting a job.1 It is not surprising, then, that more than 90 percent of companies with 500 or more employees offer retirement plans. The five largest hotel companies in the U.S. have over $10 billion in assets under management in their retirement plans, making these plans a key component in retirement investment decisions.

On Investor Preferences and Mutual Fund Separation

We extend Cass and Stiglitz’s analysis of preference-based mutual fund separation. We show that high degrees of fund separation can be constructed by adding inverse marginal utility functions exhibiting lower degrees of separation. However, this method does not allow us to find all utility functions satisfying fund separation. In general, we do not know how to write the primal utility functions in these models in closed form, but we can do so in the special case of SAHARA utility defined by Chen et al. and for a new class of GOBI preferences introduced here. We show that there is money separation (in which the riskless asset can be one of the funds) if and only if there is a fund (which may not be the riskless asset) with a constant allocation as wealth changes.