Agency, Financial Flexibility, and Firm Value: Evidence from REITs

We show empirically that the use of unsecured debt, whose standard covenants commit management to the preservation of debt capacity, leads to lower and more stable leverage. We then show that firm value is sensitive to leverage levels and leverage stability, decreasing in the former and increasing in the latter. Our results support a liquidity-centric version of Jensen's (1986) free cash flow argument. In this version, self-serving managerial tendencies are reigned in without raising leverage indiscriminately, so that financial flexibility is preserved.

Future Earnings Growth Volatility and the Value Premium

The value premium is well established in empirical asset pricing, but to date there is little understanding as to its fundamental drivers. We use a stochastic earnings valuation model to establish a direct link between the volatility of future earnings growth and firm value. We illustrate that risky earnings growth affects growth and value firms differently. We provide empirical evidence that the volatility of future earnings growth is a significant determinant of the value premium. Using data on individual firms and characteristic-sorted test portfolios, we also find that earnings growth volatility is significant in explaining the cross-sectional variation of stock returns. Our findings imply that the value premium is the rational consequence of accounting for risky earnings growth in the firm valuation process.

REIT Capital Structure Choices: Preparation Matters

Sun, Titman, and Twite (2015) find that capital structure risks, namely high leverage and a high share of short-term debt, reduced the cumulative total return of US REITs in the 2007-2009 financial crisis. We find that mitigating capital structure risks ahead of the crisis by reducing leverage and extending debt maturity in 2006, was associated with a significantly higher cumulative total return 2007-2009, after controlling for the levels of those variables at the start of the financial crisis. We further identify two systematic cross-sectional differences between those REITs that reduced capital structure risks prior to the financial crisis and those that did not: the exposure to capital structure risks and the strength of corporate governance. On balance, our findings are consistent with the interpretation of risk-reducing adjustments to capital structure ahead of the crisis as a component of managerial skill and discipline with significant implications for firm value during the crisis.