On Investor Preferences and Mutual Fund Separation

We extend Cass and Stiglitz’s analysis of preference-based mutual fund separation. We show that high degrees of fund separation can be constructed by adding inverse marginal utility functions exhibiting lower degrees of separation. However, this method does not allow us to find all utility functions satisfying fund separation. In general, we do not know how to write the primal utility functions in these models in closed form, but we can do so in the special case of SAHARA utility defined by Chen et al. and for a new class of GOBI preferences introduced here. We show that there is money separation (in which the riskless asset can be one of the funds) if and only if there is a fund (which may not be the riskless asset) with a constant allocation as wealth changes.

Is Trading Behavior Stable Across Contexts? Evidence from Style and Multi-Style Investors

In this paper we study priming of identity within the context of inherent vs. contextual financial decision making. We use a sample of individual trading accounts in equity-style funds taken from one fund family to test the hypothesis that trading styles are inherent vs. contextual. Our sample contains investors who invest either in a growth fund, a value fund, or both. We document behavioral differences between growth fund investors and value fund investors. We find that their trades depend on past returns in different ways: growth fund investors tend towards momentum trading and value fund investors tend towards contrarian trading. These differences may be due to inherent clientele characteristics, including beliefs about market prices, specific personality traits and cognitive strategies that cause them to self-select into one or the other style. We use a sample of investors that trade in both types of funds to test this proposition. Consistent with the contextual hypothesis, we find that investors who hold both types of funds trade growth fund shares differently than value fund shares.

Asset Management and Investment Banking

We find evidence that conflicts of interest are pervasive in the asset management business owned by investment banks. Using data from 1990 to 2008, we compare the alphas of mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional funds operated by investment banks and non-bank conglomerates. We find that, while no difference exists in performance by fund type, being owned by an investment bank reduces alphas by 46 basis points per year in our baseline model. Making lead loans increases alphas, but the dispersion of fees across portfolios decreases alphas. The economic loss is $4.9 billion per year.