2 resultados para perceptual narrowing
em SAPIENTIA - Universidade do Algarve - Portugal
Resumo:
In his introduction, Pinna (2010) quoted one of Wertheimer’s observations: “I stand at the window and see a house, trees, sky. Theoretically I might say there were 327 brightnesses and nuances of color. Do I have ‘327’? No. I have sky, house, and trees.” This seems quite remarkable, for Max Wertheimer, together with Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Koehler, was a pioneer of Gestalt Theory: perceptual organisation was tackled considering grouping rules of line and edge elements in relation to figure-ground segregation, i.e., a meaningful object (the figure) as perceived against a complex background (the ground). At the lowest level – line and edge elements – Wertheimer (1923) himself formulated grouping principles on the basis of proximity, good continuation, convexity, symmetry and, often forgotten, past experience of the observer. Rubin (1921) formulated rules for figure-ground segregation using surroundedness, size and orientation, but also convexity and symmetry. Almost a century of research into Gestalt later, Pinna and Reeves (2006) introduced the notion of figurality, meant to represent the integrated set of properties of visual objects, from the principles of grouping and figure-ground to the colour and volume of objects with shading. Pinna, in 2010, went one important step further and studied perceptual meaning, i.e., the interpretation of complex figures on the basis of past experience of the observer. Re-establishing a link to Wertheimer’s rule about past experience, he formulated five propositions, three definitions and seven properties on the basis of observations made on graphically manipulated patterns. For example, he introduced the illusion of meaning by comics-like elements suggesting wind, therefore inducing a learned interpretation. His last figure shows a regular array of squares but with irregular positions on the right side. This pile of (ir)regular squares can be interpreted as the result of an earthquake which destroyed part of an apartment block. This is much more intuitive, direct and economic than describing the complexity of the array of squares.
Resumo:
Theories of embodied cognition argue that language processing arises not from amodal symbols that redescribe sensorimotor and affective experiences, but from partial simulations (reenactments) of modality-specific states. Recent findings on processing of words and sentences support such a stance emphasizing that the role of the body in the domain of language comprehension should not be overlooked or dismissed. The present research was conducted to extend prior work in two important ways. First, the role of simulation was tested with connected discourse rather than words or sentences presented in isolation. Second, both “online” and “offline” measures of discourse comprehension were taken. In Experiments 1 and 2 participants’ facial postures were manipulated to show that preparing the body for processing of emotion-congruent information improves discourse comprehension. In Experiment 3 the direction of body posture was manipulated to show that implicit properties of simulations, such as spatial dimension or location, are at least somewhat involved in processing of large language segments such as discourse. Finally, in Experiments 4 and 5 participants’ body movement and body posture were manipulated to show that even understanding of language describing metaphorical actions physically impossible to perform involves constructing a sensorimotor simulation of the described event. The major result was that compatibility between embodiment and language strongly modulated performance effectiveness in experiments on simulation of emotion and metaphorical action. The effect of simulation on comprehension of discourse implying spatial dimension was fragile. These findings support an embodied simulation account of cognition suggesting that sensorimotor and affective states are at least partially implicated in “online” and “offline” discourse comprehension.