Various Joyful Encounters with the Dystopias of Affective Capitalism

This article contends that what appear to be the dystopic conditions of affective capitalism are just as likely to be felt in various joyful encounters as they are in atmospheres of fear associated with post 9/11 securitization. Moreover, rather than grasping these joyful encounters with capitalism as an ideological trick working directly on cognitive systems of belief, they are approached here by way of a repressive affective relation a population establishes between politicized sensory environments and what Deleuze and Guattari (1994) call a brain-becoming-subject. This is a radical relationality (Protevi, 2010) understood in this context as a mostly nonconscious brain-somatic process of subjectification occurring in contagious sensory environments populations become politically situated in. The joyful encounter is not therefore merely an ideological manipulation of belief, but following Gabriel Tarde (as developed in Sampson, 2012), belief is always the object of desire. The discussion starts by comparing recent efforts by Facebook to manipulate mass emotional contagion to a Huxleyesque control through appeals to joy. Attention is then turned toward further manifestations of affective capitalism; beginning with the so-called emotional turn in the neurosciences, which has greatly influenced marketing strategies intended to unconsciously influence consumer mood (and choice), and ending with a further comparison between encounters with Nazi joy in the 1930s (Protevi, 2010) and the recent spreading of right wing populism similarly loaded with political affect. Indeed, the dystopian presence of a repressive political affect in all of these examples prompts an initial question concerning what can be done to a brain so that it involuntarily conforms to the joyful encounter. That is to say, what can affect theory say about an apparent brain-somatic vulnerability to affective suggestibility and a tendency toward mass repression? However, the paper goes on to frame a second (and perhaps more significant) question concerning what can a brain do. Through the work of John Protevi (in Hauptmann and Neidich (eds.), 2010: 168-183), Catherine Malabou (2009) and Christian Borch (2005), the article discusses how affect theory can conceive of a brain-somatic relation to sensory environments that might be freed from its coincidence with capitalism. This second question not only leads to a different kind of illusion to that understood as a product of an ideological trick, but also abnegates a model of the brain which limits subjectivity in the making to a phenomenological inner self or Being in the world.

Modulation of pain threshold by virtual body ownership

Background Appropriate sensorimotor correlations can result in the illusion of ownership of exogenous body parts. Nevertheless, whether and how the illusion of owning a new body part affects human perception, and in particular pain detection, is still poorly investigated. Recent findings have shown that seeing one’s own body is analgesic, but it is not known whether this effect is transferable to newly embodied, but exogenous, body parts. In recent years, results from our laboratory have demonstrated that a virtual body can be felt as one’s own, provided realistic multisensory correlations. Methods The current work aimed at investigating the impact of virtual body ownership on pain threshold. An immersive virtual environment allowed a first-person perspective of a virtual body that replaced the own. Passive movement of the index finger congruent with the movement of the virtual index finger was used in the “synchronous” condition to induce ownership of the virtual arm. The pain threshold was tested by thermal stimulation under four conditions: 1) synchronous movements of the real and virtual fingers, 2) asynchronous movements, 3) seeing a virtual object instead of an arm, and 4) not seeing any limb in real world. Results Our results show that, independently of attentional and stimulus adaptation processes, the ownership of a virtual arm per se can significantly increase the thermal pain threshold. Conclusions This finding may be relevant for the development and improvement of digital solutions for rehabilitation and pain treatment.

Real, rubber or virtual: The vision of “one’s own” body as a means for pain modulation. A narrative review

In the last few years a branch of pain research has been focussing on the modulatory effects of the vision of the body on pain perception. So, for instance, the vision of one’s own real body has been proven to induce analgesic effects. On the other hand, bodily illusions such as the rubber hand illusion have provided new tools for the study of perceptual processes during altered body ownership states. Recently, new paradigms of body ownership made use of a technology that is going places both in clinical and in experimental settings, i.e. virtual reality. While the vision of one’s own real body has been proven to yield compelling analgesic effects, slightly more controversial are those attributed to the vision of “owned” dummy bodies. This review will discuss the studies that examined the effects on pain perception of the vision of the own body, with or without body ownership illusions.