1 resultado para Occupant Protection Standards.
em Research Open Access Repository of the University of East London.
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Resumo:
A computer system's security can be compromised in many ways—a denial-of-service attack can make a server inoperable, a worm can destroy a user's private data, or an eavesdropper can reap financial rewards by inserting himself in the communication link between a customer and her bank through a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. What all these scenarios have in common is that the adversary is an untrusted entity that attacks a system from the outside—we assume that the computers under attack are operated by benign and trusted users. But if we remove this assumption, if we allow anyone operating a computer system—from system administrators down to ordinary users—to compromise that system's security, we find ourselves in a scenario that has received comparatively little attention.