Gobernar la educación a través de los padrespolítica educativa y construcción de subjetividades neoliberales en Inglaterra. (Governing education through parents: education policy and the construction of neoliberal subjectivities in England)

In this paper we explore the relationship between market norms and practices and the development of the figure of the parent within British education policy. Since the 1970s parents in England have been called upon to perform certain duties and obligations in their relation to the state. These duties include internalizing responsibility for risks, liabilities, inequities and the spectre of crises formerly managed by the state. Rather than characterize this situation in terms of the ‘hollowing of the state’, we argue that the role of the state includes enabling the functioning of the parent as a neoliberal subject, so that they may successfully harness the power of the market to their own advantage and (hopefully) minimize the kinds of risk generated through a deregulated education system. In this paper we examine how parents are compelled to embody certain market norms and practices as they navigate the field of education. In particular we focus on how parents are 1) summoned as consumers or choosers of education services, and thus encouraged to embody through their behaviour a competitive orientation; 2) summoned as governors and custodians of schools, with a focus on assessing financial and educational performance; and 3) summoned as producers and founders of schools, with a focus on entrepreneurial and innovative activity.

Greece, global fault-lines and the disintegrative logics of Germany’s primacy in Europe

Post-Keynesian, heterodox and Marxist political economists have rightly argued that the eurozone crisis is not a fiscal crisis but a balance of payments crisis, mainly caused by the pivotal position of Germany in the European Monetary Union (EMU) and its neo-mercantilist model of growth (low wage, low inflation and export-led). This view, however, sees the split between core and periphery in the European Union as something created with the introduction of the EMU in 1999. This chapter contends that this is not the case. By putting forth a global fault-lines historical perspective and focusing on the case of Greece, it is argued that the problem is not the introduction of the EMU but the geopolitical and macroeconomic asymmetries between core and periphery in Europe since the inception of what vaguely – and even inaccurately – can be defined as ‘European modernity’. Global fault-lines offer a macro-historical and macroeconomic understanding of crises seen as structural events generated by the evolving and contradictory tendencies of capitalism as a world system. It is not just a political economy perspective but a perspective that encompasses many instances of the social, especially geopolitical and geocultural structures.