The Effect of Water Consumption on Schoolchildren's Fine Motor Skills, Cognitive Function and Mood

Previous research has suggested that dehydration may have a negative effect on some aspects of mood, cognitive performance and motor skills (Benton, 2011). Furthermore, a large proportion of children arrive at school in a dehydrated state (Baron, Courbebaisse, Lepicard, & Friedlander, 2015). The present work investigated whether supplementing children with water may, as a consequence of reducing dehydration, improve their cognitive performance and motor skills. In studies 1, 2, 3 and 5, it was found that tasks that predominantly tested motor skills, were improved in children who had a drink, compared to those who did not. Furthermore, study 3 showed that this effect was moderated by hydration status. One theoretical explanation for the poorer performance of dehydrated children is that they may lack the neurological resources to sustain their effort and thus performance does not improve over time. In support of this, these studies showed that, when re-hydrated, performance on these tasks improves to the level of non-dehydrated children. Study 2 showed that the number of errors increased in a StopSignal task in children that had high self-rated levels of thirst, compared to low levels: and hydration status did not moderate this effect. A possible explanation for the increased number of errors in children with high self-rated thirst is that the thirst sensation diverts attention away from the task, causing task performance to deteriorate. In study 4, it was observed that there was a large variation in intra-individual and inter-individual hydration scores throughout the day, which was not related to volume drank or levels of thirst. Further studies should use imaging techniques to study brain activity during dehydration and rehydration, and during periods of high thirst, to help to further elucidate the mechanism underlying the negative effect of dehydration on motor performance, and the effect of self-rated thirst on attention.

Perceived positive and negative consequences after surviving cancer and their relation to quality of life

Surviving childhood cancer has multiple implications on both physical and psychological domains of the individual. However, its study and possible effects on health-related quality of life (HRQoL) outcomes of adolescent survivors has been understudied. The objective of this study was twofold; to assess positive and negative cancer-related consequences (psychosocial and physical) in a sample of adolescent cancer survivors and to explore their relationship with HRQoL outcomes. Forty-one participants answered two questions about positive and negative consequences in the aftermath of cancer and filled in the KIDSCREEN-52 self-reported version. Data were analysed using mixed methods approach. 87.8% of the sample identified positive consequences and 63.4% negative consequences in survivorship. Four positive categories and five negative categories with regard to cancer-related consequences were found. Changed perspectives in life narratives seem to be the positive consequence more related to HRQoL (physical well-being, mood & emotions, autonomy, social support & peers), followed by useful life experience (physical well-being, autonomy, social support & peers). Psychological impact was the most referred negative consequence with a significant detrimental effect on social support and peers HRQoL dimension. Even if the majority of survivors reported benefit finding in the aftermath of cancer, concomitant positive and negative consequences have been found. However, findings only reveal a significant relationship between positive narratives and HRQoL, and negative consequences do not seem to have a significant influence on overall HRQoL in survivorship.

Various Joyful Encounters with the Dystopias of Affective Capitalism

This article contends that what appear to be the dystopic conditions of affective capitalism are just as likely to be felt in various joyful encounters as they are in atmospheres of fear associated with post 9/11 securitization. Moreover, rather than grasping these joyful encounters with capitalism as an ideological trick working directly on cognitive systems of belief, they are approached here by way of a repressive affective relation a population establishes between politicized sensory environments and what Deleuze and Guattari (1994) call a brain-becoming-subject. This is a radical relationality (Protevi, 2010) understood in this context as a mostly nonconscious brain-somatic process of subjectification occurring in contagious sensory environments populations become politically situated in. The joyful encounter is not therefore merely an ideological manipulation of belief, but following Gabriel Tarde (as developed in Sampson, 2012), belief is always the object of desire. The discussion starts by comparing recent efforts by Facebook to manipulate mass emotional contagion to a Huxleyesque control through appeals to joy. Attention is then turned toward further manifestations of affective capitalism; beginning with the so-called emotional turn in the neurosciences, which has greatly influenced marketing strategies intended to unconsciously influence consumer mood (and choice), and ending with a further comparison between encounters with Nazi joy in the 1930s (Protevi, 2010) and the recent spreading of right wing populism similarly loaded with political affect. Indeed, the dystopian presence of a repressive political affect in all of these examples prompts an initial question concerning what can be done to a brain so that it involuntarily conforms to the joyful encounter. That is to say, what can affect theory say about an apparent brain-somatic vulnerability to affective suggestibility and a tendency toward mass repression? However, the paper goes on to frame a second (and perhaps more significant) question concerning what can a brain do. Through the work of John Protevi (in Hauptmann and Neidich (eds.), 2010: 168-183), Catherine Malabou (2009) and Christian Borch (2005), the article discusses how affect theory can conceive of a brain-somatic relation to sensory environments that might be freed from its coincidence with capitalism. This second question not only leads to a different kind of illusion to that understood as a product of an ideological trick, but also abnegates a model of the brain which limits subjectivity in the making to a phenomenological inner self or Being in the world.