Experimental and discrete element modelling of cohesive iron ore fines

In this study, the behaviour of iron ore fines with varying levels of adhesion was investigated using a confined compression test and a uniaxial test. The uniaxial test was conducted using the semi-automated uniaxial EPT tester in which the cohesive strength of a bulk solid is evaluated from an unconfined compression test following a period of consolidation to a pre-defined vertical stress. The iron ore fines were also tested by measuring both the vertical and circumferential strains on the cylindrical container walls under vertical loading in a separate confined compression tester - the K0 tester, to determine the lateral pressure ratio. Discrete Element Method simulations of both experiments were carried out and the predictions were compared with the experimental observations. A recently developed DEM contact model for cohesive solids, an Elasto-Plastic Adhesive model, was used. This particle contact model uses hysteretic non-linear loading and unloading paths and an adhesion parameter which is a function of the maximum contact overlap. The model parameters for the simulations are phenomenologically based to reproduce the key bulk characteristics exhibited by the solid. The simulation results show a good agreement in capturing the stress history dependent behaviour depicted by the flow function of the cohesive iron ore fines while also providing a reasonably good match for the lateral pressure ratio observed during the confined compression K0 tests. This demonstrates the potential for the DEM model to be used in the simulation of bulk handling applications.

How high (and far) can you go? On setting fines in cartel cases involving vertically-integrated undertakings and foreign sales

Any Nearer to Victory in the Fifty Years War?:Assessing the European Commission’s Leadership, Weapons and Strategies towards combating Cartels

Some 50 years after its creation EU competition policy remains firmly entrenched as one of the most developed examples of supranational governance within the European Union. Although there has been a marked increase in interest among political scientists in competition policy in recent years there are still gaps in terms of overall coverage. One area that has been largely overlooked centres on cartels. Cartel policy has emerged as a highly salient issue and main priority of the Commission's competition policy since the late 1990s. Certainly, the recent restructuring of the EU cartel enforcement regime, the imposition of ever higher fines and a determined EU Competition Commissioner have fuelled growing media attention while new notices and regulations increasingly occupy the interests and minds of practitioners. The European Commission has constantly extended its activities on the competition policy front and its increasingly aggressive strategies to combat cartels provides political scientists with a fascinating case study of governance in action and illustrates the ways – such as leniency programmes, higher fines, enhanced and better equipped resources as well as internal reorganisation in which the European regulator is pursuing such conspiracies. This article traces the evolution and development of EU cartel policy since its inception and assesses the Commission's strategies and considers just to what extent the European Commission is winning its war against business cartelisation.

'Today’s Softness is Tomorrow’s Nightmare’::Intensifying the Fight against Cartels in Brussels and Bonn

The pursuit of hard-core cartel activity represents the core aspect of modern antitrust. Since the late 1990s, increased recognition of dangers posed by cartelization has led European competition regulators to initiate organizational changes and to modernize procedures and practice to combat cartels. However, has policy toward hard-core cartels softened in a harsher economic environment from late 2008? This article provides a comparative examination of the approach towards cartels by the European Commission and, at the national level, by the German Bundeskartellamt. It argues that, on current evidence, any doubts about how far the heightened anti-cartel drive could be sustained in the economic downturn post 2008 should be put aside. While some adjustments to fines have been made to take into account inability to pay in exceptional circumstances, no special provisions have been introduced to allow crisis cartels and it appears that the legislation continues to be interpreted strictly by the competition authorities as before.

On convergence with hiccups: recent amendments to Poland's competition law

Discusses the amendments to the Polish Competition Act 2007 adopted in June 2014 which aim to enhance the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, including the introduction of: (1) civil fines for individuals; (2) a "leniency plus" programme based on the US model; (3) a settlement procedure; and (4) extended inspection powers for the Competition Authority. Assesses the likely effectiveness of the reforms.

Modelling Cohesive-Frictional Particulate Solids for Bulk Handling Applications

Many powders and particulate solids are cohesive in nature and the strength often exhibits dependence on the consolidation stress. As a result, the stress history in the material leading up to a handling scenario needs to be considered when evaluating its handleability. This paper outlines the development of a DEM contact model accounting for plasticity and adhesion force, which is shown to be suitable for modelling the stress history dependent cohesive strength. The model was used to simulate the confined consolidation and the subsequent unconfined loading of iron ore fines with particle sizes up to 1.18mm. The predicted flow function was found to be comparable to the experimental results.