Paternalism and Populations

It is relatively uncontroversial that some public health policies are paternalistic. Furthermore, that they are paternalistic is often taken to show that they are morally wrong. In this article I challenge this position. The article starts by arguing that given standard definitions of paternalism it is unclear why such policies count as paternalistic. Whilst it might appear that they impose restrictions on what individuals can, or cannot, do for their own good, this is not the case. The reason for this is that whilst public health policies focus on achieving benefits at a population or group level, the imposition is made at the level of the individual. If we are to retain the idea that such policies are paternalistic we must characterize them in such a way that both the benefit and imposition are at the same level: either that of the individual or that of the group. I argue that in many cases moving to the group level is the only plausible option. However, if we move to the group level, the features that make a policy paternalistic will not, unlike in those cases where paternalism is targeted at an individual, make the policy morally wrong.

The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism

Libertarian paternalism, as advanced by Cass Sunstein, is seriously flawed, but not primarily for the reasons that most commentators suggest. Libertarian paternalism and its attendant regulatory implications are too libertarian, not too paternalistic, and as a result are in considerable tension with ‘thick’ conceptions of human dignity. We make four arguments. The first is that there is no justification for a presumption in favor of nudging as a default regulatory strategy, as Sunstein asserts. It is ordinarily less effective than mandates; such mandates rarely offend personal autonomy; and the central reliance on cognitive failures in the nudging program is more likely to offend human dignity than the mandates it seeks to replace. Secondly, we argue that nudging as a regulatory strategy fits both overtly and covertly, often insidiously, into a more general libertarian program of political economy. Thirdly, while we are on the whole more concerned to reject the libertarian than the paternalistic elements of this philosophy, Sunstein’s work, both in Why Nudge?, and earlier, fails to appreciate how nudging may be manipulative if not designed with more care than he acknowledges. Lastly, because of these characteristics, nudging might even be subject to legal challenges that would give us the worst of all possible regulatory worlds: a weak regulatory intervention that is liable to be challenged in the courts by well-resourced interest groups. In such a scenario, and contrary to the ‘common sense’ ethos contended for in Why Nudge?, nudges might not even clear the excessively low bar of doing something rather than nothing. Those seeking to pursue progressive politics, under law, should reject nudging in favor of regulation that is more congruent with principles of legality, more transparent, more effective, more democratic, and allows us more fully to act as moral agents. Such a system may have a place for (some) nudging, but not one that departs significantly from how labeling, warnings and the like already function, and nothing that compares with Sunstein’s apparent ambitions for his new movement.

Doping, sport and the law: time for repeal of prohibition?

This article concerns the legal issues that surround the prohibition of doping in sport. The current policy on the use of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) in sport is underpinned by both a paternalistic desire to protect athletes’ health and the long-term integrity or ‘spirit’ of sport. The policy is put into administrative effect globally by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), which provides the regulatory and legal framework through which the vast majority of international sports federations harmonise their anti-doping programmes. On outlining briefly both the broad administrative structures of international sport’s various anti-doping mechanisms, and specific legal issues that arise in disciplinary hearings involving athletes accused of doping, this article questions the sustainability of the current ‘zero tolerance’ approach, arguing, by way of analogy to the wider societal debate on the criminalisation of drugs, and as informed by Sunstein and Thaler’s theory of libertarian paternalism, that current policy on anti-doping has failed. Moreover, rather than the extant moral and punitive panic regarding doping in sport, this article, drawing respectively on Seddon’s and Simon’s work on the history of drugs and crime control mentality, contends that, as an alternative, harm reductionist measures should be promoted, including consideration of the medically supervised use of certain PEDs.

Legislating about Unhealthy Food: A Millian Approach

Tackling food-related health conditions is becoming one of the most pressing issues in the policy agendas of western liberal democratic governments. In this article, I intend to illustrate what the liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill would have said about legislation on unhealthy food and I focus especially on the arguments advanced by Mill in his classic essay On Liberty ([1859] 2006). Mill is normally considered as the archetype of liberal anti-paternalism and his ideas are often invoked by those who oppose state paternalism, including those who reject legislation that restricts the consumption of unhealthy food. Furthermore, his views have been applied to related policy areas such as alcohol minimum pricing (Saunders 2013) and genetically modified food (Holtug 2001). My analysis proceeds as follows. First, I show that Mill’s account warrants some restrictions on food advertising and justifies various forms of food labelling. Second, I assess whether and to what extent Mill’s ‘harm principle’ justifies social and legal non-paternalistic penalties against unhealthy eaters who are guilty of other-regarding harm. Finally, I show that Mill’s account warrants taxing unhealthy foods, thus restricting the freedom of both responsible and irresponsible eaters and de facto justifying what I call ‘secondary paternalism’.

Children, Adults, Autonomy and Well-Being

I explore the implications of a view – that children and adults enjoy a markedly different moral and political status, wherein the latter can and should be permitted to make choices as to how they lead their lives, whereas the former should not be permitted to make such choices – for how we think about the relationship between autonomy and welfare, and in particular, in consequence, for how we evaluate paternalism. I discuss the problem of drawing a line and the ‘threshold problem’, and consider how one might, as the UNCRC requires, give a weighted role to the views of the child on matters affecting its own interests.

The Dark Side of Nudging

A podcast of a talk presented at a conference in Berlin organized by the Vervassungsblog on Choice Architecture in Democracies, in January 2015 - Verfassungsblog - Autonomy vs. Technocracy: Libertarian Paternalism revisited