Detecting stealthy attacks: Efficient monitoring of suspicious activities on computer networks

Stealthy attackers move patiently through computer networks - taking days, weeks or months to accomplish their objectives in order to avoid detection. As networks scale up in size and speed, monitoring for such attack attempts is increasingly a challenge. This paper presents an efficient monitoring technique for stealthy attacks. It investigates the feasibility of proposed method under number of different test cases and examines how design of the network affects the detection. A methodological way for tracing anonymous stealthy activities to their approximate sources is also presented. The Bayesian fusion along with traffic sampling is employed as a data reduction method. The proposed method has the ability to monitor stealthy activities using 10-20% size sampling rates without degrading the quality of detection.

Comparison of excess radiological risk of building materials and industrial by-products according to I-index (EU-BSS) and revised room model (IAEA SSG-32)

To get a better insight into the radiological features of industrial by-products that can be reused in building materials a review of the reported scientific data can be very useful. The current study is based on the continuously growing database of the By-BM (H2020-MSCA-IF-2015) project (By-products for Building Materials). Currently, the By-BM database contains individual data of about 431 by-products and 1095 building and raw materials. It was found that in case of the building materials the natural radionuclide content varied widely (Ra-226: <DL-27851 Bq/kg; Th-232: <DL-906 Bq/kg, K-40: <DL-17922 Bq/kg), more so than for the by-products (Ra-226: 7-3152 Bq/kg; Th-232: <DL-1350 Bq/kg, K-40: <DL-3001 Bq/kg). The average Ra-226, Th-232 and K-40 contents of the reported by-products were respectively 2.52, 2.35 and 0.39 times higher than the building materials. The gamma exposure of bulk building products was calculated according to IAEA Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-32 and the European Commission Radiation Protection 112 based I-index (EU BSS). It was found that in most cases the I-index without density consideration provides a significant overestimation in excess effective dose.