Thisness and Events

This essay is an investigation into the existence of primitive thisness, i.e. the property of being a particular individual. I begin with a look at what is commonly taken to be the test for primitive thisness, namely, the failure of application of the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles for some class of individuals. The two classes that I look at are those of material objects and events. I then discuss Hacking’s objection to the general project of seeking counterexamples to the Identity of Indiscernibles, and consider a response due to Adams. I argue that Hacking’s objection does, indeed, count against the instantiation of thisness by material objects. I go on to argue, however, that Hacking’s objection does not hold against the instantiation of thisness by events, and that this is due to a fundamental disanalogy between space and time.

James Croll, metaphysical geologist

James Croll (1821–90) occupies a prominent position in the history of physical geology, and his pioneering work on the causes of long-term climate change has been widely discussed. During his life he benefited from the patronage of leading men of science; his participation in scientific debates was widely acknowledged, not least through his election as a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1876. For all that, the intellectual contribution that Croll himself considered to be of most significance—his articles and two books on metaphysics—has attracted very little attention. In addressing this neglect, it is argued here that Croll's interest in metaphysics, grounded in his commitment to a Calvinist form of Christianity, was central to his life and thought. Examining together Croll's geophysical and metaphysical writings offers a different and fruitful way of understanding his scientific career and points to the wider significance of metaphysics in late-Victorian scientific culture.

Eternity, knowledge, and freedom

This article addresses the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom by developing a modi?ed version of Boethius’ solution to the problem–one that is meant to cohere with a dynamic theory of time and a conception of God as temporal. I begin the article by discussing the traditional Boethian solution, and a defence of it due to Kretzmann and Stump. After canvassing a few of the objections to this view, I then go on to o?er my own modi?ed Boethian solution, according to which temporal reality is fundamentally dynamic, but truth is not. My claim is that there are eternally existing, tenseless propositions, with determinate truth values, but that these are made true by events that come into existence, and are not themselves eternal.

Divine Events

I argue for a certain conception of events according to which they are essentially extended and temporal entities (contra Leftow), and then go on to argue that God is necessarily the subject of such events (even before creation--a claim which is particularly controversial). Together these claims entail that God is necessarily temporal.

The Ontology of Thisness

The paper seeks to give an account of what it is for an individual to instantiate thisness, and how an individual and its thisness are related (where the thisness of an individual x is the property of being identical to x). Such an account is completely lacking in the literature, even among those who defend and make use of thisness. My approach is to seek out a model for the instantiation of thisness by canvassing realist accounts of the substance/attribute relation , and then make appropriate modifications to the most likely candidate in order to accommodate an individual's instantiation of thisness (the accounts cannot be strictly identical for reasons that I explain). I go on to suggest that the model can be appropriately applied in the case of other individuals which might instantiate thisness: for example, persons and events (where these are conceived as fundamental categories of ontology distinct from material substances).

The Existence of the Past

My goal in this paper is to address what I call the ‘Incoherence’ objection to the growing universe theory of time. At the root of the objection is the thought that one cannot wed objective temporal becoming with the existence of a tenseless past—which is apparently what the growing universe theorist tries to do. To do so, however, is to attribute both dynamic and static aspects to time, and, given the mutual exclusivity of these two aspects—so the thought goes—incoherence results. My solution to the problem is to offer an alternative account of past existence that is compatible with a dynamic conception of time. I take as my starting point Adams’ suggestion that the past exists in virtue of the existence of thisnesses of past individuals. I first seek to defend this suggestion, before developing it further, in order to provide a satisfactory response to the Incoherence objection. The result is a new growing universe theory which avoids the Incoherence objection but which has some surprising features of its own. Chief among these is the rejection of present events. I argue, however, that such a rejection is a necessary consequence of endorsing the growing universe theory, and that it is not as counter-intuitive as it initially sounds.