European Recommendations for Primary Prevention of Congenital Anomalies: A Joined Effort of EUROCAT and EUROPLAN Projects to Facilitate Inclusion of This Topic in the National Rare Disease Plans

Congenital anomalies (CA) are the paradigm example of rare diseases liable to primary prevention actions due to the multifactorial etiology of many of them, involving a number of environmental factors together with genetic predispositions. Yet despite the preventive potential, lack of attention to an integrated preventive strategy has led to the prevalence of CA remaining relatively stable in recent decades. The 2 European projects, EUROCAT and EUROPLAN, have joined efforts to provide the first science-based and comprehensive set of recommendations for the primary prevention of CA in the European Union. The resulting EUROCAT-EUROPLAN 'Recommendations on Policies to Be Considered for the Primary Prevention of Congenital Anomalies in National Plans and Strategies on Rare Diseases' were issued in 2012 and endorsed by EUCERD (European Union Committee of Experts on Rare Diseases) in 2013. The recommendations exploit interdisciplinary expertise encompassing drugs, diet, lifestyles, maternal health status, and the environment. The recommendations include evidence-based actions aimed at reducing risk factors and at increasing protective factors and behaviors at both individual and population level. Moreover, consideration is given to topics specifically related to CA (e.g. folate status, teratogens) as well as of broad public health impact (e.g. obesity, smoking) which call for specific attention to their relevance in the pre- and periconceptional period. The recommendations, reported entirely in this paper, are a comprehensive tool to implement primary prevention into national policies on rare diseases in Europe.

The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism

Libertarian paternalism, as advanced by Cass Sunstein, is seriously flawed, but not primarily for the reasons that most commentators suggest. Libertarian paternalism and its attendant regulatory implications are too libertarian, not too paternalistic, and as a result are in considerable tension with ‘thick’ conceptions of human dignity. We make four arguments. The first is that there is no justification for a presumption in favor of nudging as a default regulatory strategy, as Sunstein asserts. It is ordinarily less effective than mandates; such mandates rarely offend personal autonomy; and the central reliance on cognitive failures in the nudging program is more likely to offend human dignity than the mandates it seeks to replace. Secondly, we argue that nudging as a regulatory strategy fits both overtly and covertly, often insidiously, into a more general libertarian program of political economy. Thirdly, while we are on the whole more concerned to reject the libertarian than the paternalistic elements of this philosophy, Sunstein’s work, both in Why Nudge?, and earlier, fails to appreciate how nudging may be manipulative if not designed with more care than he acknowledges. Lastly, because of these characteristics, nudging might even be subject to legal challenges that would give us the worst of all possible regulatory worlds: a weak regulatory intervention that is liable to be challenged in the courts by well-resourced interest groups. In such a scenario, and contrary to the ‘common sense’ ethos contended for in Why Nudge?, nudges might not even clear the excessively low bar of doing something rather than nothing. Those seeking to pursue progressive politics, under law, should reject nudging in favor of regulation that is more congruent with principles of legality, more transparent, more effective, more democratic, and allows us more fully to act as moral agents. Such a system may have a place for (some) nudging, but not one that departs significantly from how labeling, warnings and the like already function, and nothing that compares with Sunstein’s apparent ambitions for his new movement.

"It's just not cricket". Or is it?

Considers the Wolverhampton County Court decision in Bartlett v English Cricket Board Association of Cricket Officials on whether cricket umpires at an amateur match were liable for injuries to a player based on their inspection of the condition of the cricket ground after heavy rain and their decision to allow play to proceed. Comments on the approach to the umpires' standard of care.