Private rule-making and European governance - issues of legitimacy

Private rule-making is widely discussed as supporting institutional policy making and legislation at EU level. The following argues for a different perspective on private actor rule-making, focusing on the autonomy of social realms within which self-governance may be possible. From this perspective, private actor rule-making is considered as a potential gain in self-determination. Substantive autonomy and enhanced self-determination of all those affected are considered as prerequisites for accepting rules made by private actors. Opening the field for discussion, some manifestations of (envisaged) private rule-making at EU level are explored and discussed as to whether they should be accepted as legitimate forms of self-governance.

The impact of equity markets and corporate governance on labour market flexibility

Drawing from various literatures, this article explores links between equity markets and labour market flexibility. Various data sources are used to test relationships for a set of OECD countries, controlling for other likely influences on flexibility such as government and industrial relations institutions. The results are generally supportive as regards employment flexibility: equity market trading activity is associated with shorter job tenure, higher activity rates, and greater employment change over the cycle. However, the relationship between equity markets and pay flexibility is less statistically robust to the addition of controls.

Independent Directors and Corporate Governance

The paper examines the reliance placed in the United Kingdom and Australia on the concept of ‘independent directors’ as a mechanism to ensure better (less crisis prone) corporate governance. The article suggests that there is an over emphasis placed on some rather limited psychological evidence that independence in the boardroom produces more critical thinking and informed discussion thus leading to higher quality decision-making. The article offers others evidence, drawn from the material on the psychology of group formation and group discussion, which suggests that this confidence in ‘independence’ is misplaced. The article exposes a misunderstanding between independence as a character trait and independence as a structural concern which goes to the heart of the corporate governance discourse around the benefits of independence.

Understanding Corporate Governance Reform in South Africa: Anglo-American Divergence, the King Reports and Hybridization

This article investigates corporate governance reform in South Africa in the context of the country’s international links with Anglo-American corporate governance and domestic pursuit of socioeconomic development. Two key questions are evaluated. (a) How has divergence within the Anglo-American model influenced corporate governance reform in South Africa? (b) Can South Africa’s historical closeness to the Anglo-American model be combined with increasing attention to stakeholder issues to produce a hybrid “African model” of corporate governance? Evaluating these questions, the following issues are explored in turn: the contrast between shareholder and stakeholder models, divergence between U.S. and U.K. approaches to corporate governance as exemplified by Sarbanes-Oxley, locating a South African approach in context of the Anglo-American model, the King reports and an emerging “African” model of corporate governance, and the role of international and domestic factors in shaping South Africa’s ongoing reform process.

Internalities and the Foundations of Corporate Governance

This paper considers the potential contained in an 'internalities' approach to corporate governance. Rather than viewing the company as a ‘black box’ that can only be regulated through state action, we argue that corporate governance holds in tension the relationship between investors, managers and the corporate board. It is from that tension that a change in corporate culture will emerge. We argue that a state focus on promoting and managing the dialogical character of corporate governance will limit the negative effects of corporate power

Corporate Governance as a School of Social Reform

In this paper, I present a vision of the corporation as a moral person. I point to “the separation of ownership and control” as a moment when the corporation broke away from the moral lives of ownermanagers. I then draw out the manner in which we can speak of the company as a moral person. Finally, through a discussion of social reporting in two British banks, I point to a shift in how this moral personhood is articulated, with the rise of corporate governance—or doing business well—as its own foundation of corporate responsibility. I propose a view of corporate responsibility as a “transmission mechanism” for the company’s role in moral life, situated in the broader social conception of “moral economy.” This viewpoint sets out landscapes of legitimation and justification through which the ties that underpin economic life are founded