Honest and dishonest displays, motivational state and subsequent decisions in hermit crab shell fights

Animal fights are typically preceded by displays and there is debate whether these are always honest. We investigated the prefight period in hermit crabs, Pagurus bernhardus, during which up to four types of display plus other activities that might provide information are performed. We determined how each display influences or predicts various fight decisions, and related these displays to the motivational state of the attacker, as determined by a startle response, and of the motivational state of the defender, as determined by the duration for which it resisted eviction from its shell. Two displays appeared to have consistent but different effects. Cheliped presentation, where the claws were held in a stationary position, often by both crabs but for longer by the larger, seemed to be honest, and allowed for mutual size assessment. This display enhanced the motivation and the success of the larger crab. In contrast, cheliped extension, involving the rapid thrust of the open chelae towards the opponent, did not seem to allow for mutual size assessment and may contain an element of bluff. It was performed more by the smaller crab and enhanced its success. The complexity of displays in this species appears to allow for both honesty and manipulation.

Fighting for shells: how private information about resource value changes hermit crab pre-fight displays and escalated fight behaviour

Pre-fight displays typically provide honest, but sometimes dishonest, information about resource holding potential and may be influenced by assessment of resource value and hence motivation to acquire the resource. These assessments of potential costs and benefits are also predicted to influence escalated fight behaviour. This is examined in shell exchange contests of hermit crabs in which we establish an information asymmetry about a particularly poor quality shell. The poor shell was created by gluing sand to the interior whereas control shells lacked sand and the low value of the poor shell could not be accurately assessed by the opponent. Crabs in the poor shell showed changes in the use of pre-fight displays, apparently to increase the chances of swapping shells. When the fights escalated, crabs in poor shells fought harder if they took the role of attacker but gave up quickly if in the defender role. These tactics appear to be adaptive but do not result in a major shift in the roles taken or outcome. We thus link resource assessment with pre-fight displays, the roles taken, tactics used during escalation and the outcome of these contests.

Motivation matters: cheliped extension displays in the hermit crab, Pagurus bernhardus, are honest signals of hunger

Whether animal signals convey honest information is a central evolutionary question, since selection pressures could, in some circumstances, favour dishonesty. A prior study of signalling in hermit crabs proposed that the cheliped extension display of Pagurus bernhardus might represent such an instance of dishonesty. A limitation of this conclusion, however, was that honesty was defined in the context of size assessment, neglecting the potential information that displays might transmit about signallers' variable internal states. Recent analyses of signalling in this same species have shown that its displays provide reliable information about the amount of risk crabs are prepared to tolerate, which therefore might enable signallers to use these displays to honestly convey their motivation to take such risks. Here we test this 'honest advertisement of motivation' hypothesis by varying crabs' need for food and analysing their signalling during simulated feeding conflicts against a model. When crabs were starved for 1-5 days, they dropped significantly in weight. Despite this decrement in resource-holding potential and energy reserves, crabs were more likely to perform cheliped extension displays the longer they were food deprived. Longer-starved crabs, whose subjective resource value was greater, also displayed at a higher rate and were more likely to risk seizing the food from the model. We conclude that cheliped extension is a reliable indicator of crabs' internal state and suggest how this honest signal might operate in conflicts over a variety of other resources in addition to food. We propose that future studies detecting apparent dishonesty should analyse many possible signal-state correlations before concluding a signal is actually dishonest. (c) 2008 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.