STPA-SafeSec: Safety and Security Analysis for Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems tightly integrate physical processes and information and communication technologies. As today’s critical infrastructures, e.g., the power grid or water distribution networks, are complex cyber-physical systems, ensuring their safety and security becomes of paramount importance. Traditional safety analysis methods, such as HAZOP, are ill-suited to assess these systems. Furthermore, cybersecurity vulnerabilities are often not considered critical, because their effects on the physical processes are not fully understood. In this work, we present STPA-SafeSec, a novel analysis methodology for both safety and security. Its results show the dependencies between cybersecurity vulnerabilities and system safety. Using this information, the most effective mitigation strategies to ensure safety and security of the system can be readily identified. We apply STPA-SafeSec to a use case in the power grid domain, and highlight its benefits.

Early warning systems for cyber defence

Cybercriminals ramp up their efforts with sophisticated techniques while defenders gradually update their typical security measures. Attackers often have a long-term interest in their targets. Due to a number of factors such as scale, architecture and nonproductive traffic however it makes difficult to detect them using typical intrusion detection techniques. Cyber early warning systems (CEWS) aim at alerting such attempts in their nascent stages using preliminary indicators. Design and implementation of such systems involves numerous research challenges such as generic set of indicators, intelligence gathering, uncertainty reasoning and information fusion. This paper discusses such challenges and presents the reader with compelling motivation. A carefully deployed empirical analysis using a real world attack scenario and a real network traffic capture is also presented.

Towards a Resilience Metric Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems

Resilience is widely accepted as a desirable system property for cyber-physical systems. However, there are no metrics that can be used to measure the resilience of cyber-physical systems (CPS) while the multi-dimensional nature of performance in these systems is considered. In this work, we present first results towards a resilience metric framework. The key contributions of this framework are threefold: First, it allows to evaluate resilience with respect to different performance indicators that are of interest. Second, complexities that are relevant to the performance indicators of interest, can be intentionally abstracted. Third and final, it supports the identification of reasons for good or bad resilience to improve system design.

Tropical limestone forest resilience and late Pleistocene foraging during MIS-2 in the Tràng An massif, Vietnam

In this paper we present a multi-proxy study of tropical limestone forest and its utilization by human groups during the major climatic and environmental upheavals of MIS-2 (29-11.7 kBP). Our data are drawn from new field research within the Tràng An World Heritage property on the edge of the Red River Delta, northern Vietnam. Key findings from this study include 1) that limestone forest formations were resilient to the large-scale landscape transformation of the Sunda continent at the end of the last glaciation; 2) that prehistoric human groups were probably present in this habitat through-out MIS-2; and 3) that the forested, insular, karst of Tràng An provided foragers with a stable resource-base in a wider changing landscape. These results have implications for our understanding of the prehistoric utilization of karst environments, and resonance for their conservation in the face of climate and environmental change today.