Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation

We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent and study the differences induced by two levels of individual rationality. Perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when players are assumed to behave as finite automata of limited complexity. We provide structural properties of the sequences of networks which are likely to form in Nash and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the repeated game. For instance, players can form totally different connected networks at each period or the sequence of networks can exhibit a total order relationship.

Solid-bound, proton-driven, fluorescent ‘off–on–off’ switches based on PET (photoinduced electron transfer)

Anthracene-based, H+-driven, ‘off–on–off’ fluorescent PET (photoinduced electron transfer) switches are immobilized on organic and inorganic polymeric solids in the form of Tentagel® and silica, respectively. The environment of the organic bead displaces apparent switching thresholds towards lower pH values whereas the Si–O- groups of silica electrostatically cause the opposite effect. These switches are ternary logic gate tags, one of which can be particularly useful in strengthening molecular computational identification (MCID) of small solid objects.

On the Uncoded BER Performance Bound of the IEEE 802.16d Channel

In this letter, the performance bound of the IEEE 802.16d channel is examined analytically in order to gain an insight into its theoretical potential. Different design strategies, such as orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) and single-carrier frequency-domain equalization (SC-FDE), time-domain decision feedback equalization (DFE), and sphere decoder (SD) techniques are discussed and compared to the theoretical bound.