Legal liability of coaches: a UK perspective

Attracting more coaches is fundamental to achievement of the European dimension in sport and the further promotion of sport in the European Union. Given the emerging relationship between the law and sports coaching, recruitment of such volunteers may prove problematic. Accordingly, this article critically considers the legal liability of sports coaches. To inform this debate, the issue of negligent coaching is critically scrutinised from a UK perspective, uncovering a number of distinct legal vulnerabilities facing volunteer coaches. This includes the inherent limitations of ‘objective reasonableness’ when defining the standard of care required in the particular circumstances. More specifically, fuller analysis of the justification of customary practice, and the legal doctrine of in loco parentis, reveals important ramifications for all organisations providing training and support for coaches. In short, it is argued that proactively safeguarding coaches from professional liability should be a priority for national governing bodies, and, following the recently published EU Work Plan for Sport for 2014–2017, the Expert Group on Human Resource Management in Sport. Importantly, given the EU’s supporting, coordinating and supplementing competence in developing the European dimension in sport, a Commission funded project to address the implications of the ‘compensation culture’ in sport is also recommended.

Sports coaching and the law of negligence: implications for coaching practice

The ordinary principles of the law of negligence are applicable in the context of sport, including claims brought against volunteer and professional coaches. Adopting the perspective of the coach, this article intends to raise awareness of the emerging intersection between the law of negligence and sports coaching, by utilising an interdisciplinary analysis designed to better safeguard and reassure coaches mindful of legal liability. Detailed scrutiny of two cases concerning alleged negligent coaching, with complementary discussion of some of the ethical dilemmas facing modern coaches, reinforces the legal duty and obligation of all coaches to adopt objectively reasonable and justifiable coaching practices when interacting with athletes. Problematically, since research suggests that some coaching practice may be underpinned by “entrenched legitimacy” and “uncritical inertia”, it is argued that coach education and training should place a greater emphasis on developing a coach’s awareness and understanding of the evolving legal context in which they discharge the duty of care incumbent upon them.

Beyond the ‘Tomlinson Trap’: Analysing the Effectiveness of Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006

One of the intentions underpinning section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 was to provide reassurance to individual volunteers, and voluntary organisations, involved in what the provision called ‘desirable activities’ and including sport. The perception was that such volunteers, motivated by an apprehension about their increased vulnerability to negligence liability, and as driven by a fear of a wider societal compensation culture, were engaging excessively in risk-averse behaviour to the detriment of such socially desirable activities. Academic commentary on section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 has largely regarded the provision as unnecessary and doing little more than restating existing common law practice. This article argues otherwise and, on critically reviewing the emerging jurisprudence, posits the alternative view that section 1, in practice, affords an enhanced level of protection and safeguarding for individuals undertaking functions in connection with a desirable activity. Nonetheless, the occasionally idiosyncratic judicial interpretation given to term ‘desirable activity’, potentially compounded by recent enactment of the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015, remains problematic. Two points of interest will be used to inform this debate. First, an analysis of the then House of Lords’ decision in Tomlinson and its celebrated ‘balancing exercise’ when assessing reasonableness in the context of negligence liability. Second, a fuller analysis of the application of section 1 in the specific context of negligence actions relating to the coaching of sport where it is argued that the, albeit limited, jurisprudence might support the practical utility of a heightened evidential threshold of gross negligence.

MODERN SPORT COACHING AND THE LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR COACH EDUCATION

Introduction
The intersection between the law of negligence and sport coaching in the UK is a developing area (Partington, 2014; Kevan, 2005). Crucially, since the law of negligence may be regarded as generally similar everywhere (Magnus, 2006), with the predominance of volunteer coaches in the UK reflective of the majority of countries in the world (Duffy et al., 2011), a detailed scrutiny of this relationship from the perspective of the coach uncovers important implications for coach education beyond this jurisdiction.  
Argumentation
Fulfilment of the legal duty of discharging reasonable care may be regarded as consistent with the ethical obligation not to expose athletes to unreasonable risks of injury (Mitten, 2013). More specifically, any ‘profession’ requiring ‘special skill or competence’ (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582), including the coaching of sport (e.g., Davenport v Farrow [2010] EWHC 550), requires a higher standard of care to be displayed than would be expected of the ordinary reasonable person (Lunney & Oliphant, 2013; Jones & Dugdale, 2010). For instance, volunteer coaches with no formal qualifications (e.g., Fowles v Bedfordshire County Council [1996] ELR 51) would be judged by this benchmark of professional liability (Powell & Stewart, 2012). Further, as the principles of coaching are constantly assessed and revised (Cassidy et al., 2009; Taylor & Garratt, 2010), so too is the legal standard of care required of coaches (Powell & Stewart, 2012). Problematically, ethical concerns may include coaches being unwilling to increase knowledge, abusive treatment of players and incompetence/inexperience (Haney et al., 1998). These factors accentuate coaches’ exposure to civil liability.
Implications
It is imperative that coaches have an awareness of this emerging intersection and develop a ‘proactive risk assessment lens’ (Hartley, 2010). In addition to supporting the professionalisation of sport coaching, coach education/CPD focused on the legal and ethical aspects of coaching (Duffy et al., 2011; Telfer, 2010; Haney et al., 1998) would enhance the safety and welfare of performers, safeguard coaches from litigation risk, and potentially improve all levels of coaching (Partington, 2014). Interestingly, there is evidence to suggest a demand from coaches for more training on health and safety issues, including risk management and (ir)responsible coaching (Stirling et al., 2012). Accordingly, critical examination of the issue of negligent coaching would inform coach education by: enabling the modelling and sharing of best practice; unpacking important ethical concerns; and, further informing the classification of coaching as a ‘profession’.

WHAT DOES THE SOCIAL ACTION, RESPONSIBILITY & HEROISM ACT 2015 MEAN FOR SPORTS VOLUNTEERS AND NGBS?

By highlighting the context of sports coaching in the UK, this article reveals the considerable limitations of both section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006, and the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015, in safeguarding (volunteer) coaches from negligence liability.

Comparing Shame in Clinical and Nonclinical Populations: Preliminary Findings

OBJECTIVES: To conduct a preliminary study comparing different trauma and clinical populations on types of shame coping style and levels of state shame and guilt.

METHODS: A mixed independent groups/correlational design was employed. Participants were recruited by convenience sampling of 3 clinical populations-complex trauma (n = 65), dissociative identity disorder (DID; n = 20), and general mental health (n = 41)-and a control group of healthy volunteers (n = 125). All participants were given (a) the Compass of Shame Scale, which measures the four common shame coping behaviors/styles of "withdrawal," "attack self," "attack other," and "avoidance," and (b) the State Shame and Guilt Scale, which assesses state shame, guilt, and pride.

RESULTS: The DID group exhibited significantly higher levels of "attack self," "withdrawal," and "avoidance" relative to the other groups. The complex trauma and general mental health groups did not differ on any shame variable. All three clinical groups had significantly greater levels of the "withdrawal" coping style and significantly impaired shame/guilt/pride relative to the healthy volunteers. "Attack self" emerged as a significant predictor of increased state shame in the complex trauma, general mental health, and healthy volunteer groups, whereas "withdrawal" was the sole predictor of state shame in the DID group.

CONCLUSIONS: DID emerged as having a different profile of shame processes compared to the other clinical groups, whereas the complex trauma and general mental health groups had comparable shame levels and variable relationships. These differential profiles of shame coping and state shame are discussed with reference to assessment and treatment. (PsycINFO Database Record