A Two-Stage Online Approach for Collaborative Multi-Agent Planning under Uncertainty

In a team of multiple agents, the pursuance of a common goal is a defining characteristic. Since agents may have different capabilities, and effects of actions may be uncertain, a common goal can generally only be achieved through a careful cooperation between the different agents. In this work, we propose a novel two-stage planner that combines online planning at both team level and individual level through a subgoal delegation scheme. The proposal brings the advantages of online planning approaches to the multi-agent setting. A number of modifications are made to a classical UCT approximate algorithm to (i) adapt it to the application domains considered, (ii) reduce the branching factor in the underlying search process, and (iii) effectively manage uncertain information of action effects by using information fusion mechanisms. The proposed online multi-agent planner reduces the cost of planning and decreases the temporal cost of reaching a goal, while significantly increasing the chance of success of achieving the common goal. 

Partial Cooperation in Location Choice: Salop’s Model with Three Firms

We consider how three firms compete in a Salop location model and how cooperation in location choice by two of these firms affects the outcomes. We con- sider the classical case of linear transportation costs as a two-stage game in which the firms select first a location on a unit circle along which consumers are dispersed evenly, followed by the competitive selection of a price. Standard analysis restricts itself to purely competitive selection of location; instead, we focus on the situation in which two firms collectively decide about location, but price their products competitively after the location choice has been effectuated. We show that such partial coordination of location is beneficial to all firms, since it reduces the number of equilibria significantly and, thereby, the resulting coordination problem. Subsequently, we show that the case of quadratic transportation costs changes the main conclusions only marginally.