Hierarchical Task Network Planning with Common-Sense Reasoning for Multiple-People Behaviour Analysis

Safety on public transport is a major concern for the relevant authorities. We
address this issue by proposing an automated surveillance platform which combines data from video, infrared and pressure sensors. Data homogenisation and integration is achieved by a distributed architecture based on communication middleware that resolves interconnection issues, thereby enabling data modelling. A common-sense knowledge base models and encodes knowledge about public-transport platforms and the actions and activities of passengers. Trajectory data from passengers is modelled as a time-series of human activities. Common-sense knowledge and rules are then applied to detect inconsistencies or errors in the data interpretation. Lastly, the rationality that characterises human behaviour is also captured here through a bottom-up Hierarchical Task Network planner that, along with common-sense, corrects misinterpretations to explain passenger behaviour. The system is validated using a simulated bus saloon scenario as a case-study. Eighteen video sequences were recorded with up to six passengers. Four metrics were used to evaluate performance. The system, with an accuracy greater than 90% for each of the four metrics, was found to outperform a rule-base system and a system containing planning alone.

Effective network security monitoring: from attribution to target-centric monitoring

Network security monitoring remains a challenge. As global networks scale up, in terms of traffic, volume and speed, effective attribution of cyber attacks is increasingly difficult. The problem is compounded by a combination of other factors, including the architecture of the Internet, multi-stage attacks and increasing volumes of nonproductive traffic. This paper proposes to shift the focus of security monitoring from the source to the target. Simply put, resources devoted to detection and attribution should be redeployed to efficiently monitor for targeting and prevention of attacks. The effort of detection should aim to determine whether a node is under attack, and if so, effectively prevent the attack. This paper contributes by systematically reviewing the structural, operational and legal reasons underlying this argument, and presents empirical evidence to support a shift away from attribution to favour of a target-centric monitoring approach. A carefully deployed set of experiments are presented and a detailed analysis of the results is achieved.