Perceptions and reality: Economic voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections

One of the most influential explanations of voting behaviour is based on economic factors: when the economy is doing well, voters reward the incumbent government and when the economy is doing badly, voters punish the incumbent. This reward-punishment model is thought to be particularly appropriate at second order contests such as European Parliament elections. Yet operationalising this economic voting model using citizens' perceptions of economic performance may suffer from endogeneity problems if citizens' perceptions are in fact a function of their party preferences rather than being a cause of their party preferences. Thus, this article models a 'strict' version of economic voting in which they purge citizens' economic perceptions of partisan effects and only use as a predictor of voting that portion of citizens' economic perceptions that is caused by the real world economy. Using data on voting at the 2004 European Parliament elections for 23 European Union electorates, the article finds some, but limited, evidence for economic voting that is dependent on both voter sophistication and clarity of responsibility for the economy within any country. First, only politically sophisticated voters' subjective economic assessments are in fact grounded in economic reality. Second, the portion of subjective economic assessments that is a function of the real world economy is a significant predictor of voting only in single party government contexts where there can be a clear attribution of responsibility. For coalition government contexts, the article finds essentially no impact of the real economy via economic perceptions on vote choice, at least at European Parliament elections.

'The Aftermath of the Annan Plan Referendums' Cross-Voting Moderation for Cyprus

This article examines recent developments in the Cyprus negotiations and suggests a number of changes to the proposed electoral system. Specifically, cross-voting and other electoral methods that encourage coalition-building across ethnic communities might add significantly to the functionality of the Annan Plan. Combined with other innovative mechanisms already in the plan, cross-voting could force political parties to seriously take into account the interests and concerns of the two Cypriot communities, an element that is currently missing from both the Turkish Cypriot (TC) and Greek Cypriot (GC) political systems. Special conditions on the island, as well as the way most political parties operated in the critical pre-April 2004 referendum period, suggest the need for this amendment. Although this study respects the consociational logic of the Annan Plan, it supplements consociationalism with elements that foster integration and inter-dependence between the two communities and their voters. The article also reviews the postreferendum developments in Cyprus which might have worrisome future implications, not only for its two communities, but also for EU enlargement in general. Cyprus both holds one of the keys to Turkey's entrance into the EU and is a litmus test for the Euro-Atlantic nexus and its capacity to pacify and integrate ethnically divided societies in Europe and elsewhere.

SOCIAL-CLASS, CLASS ORIGINS AND POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP IN THE REPUBLIC-OF-IRELAND

As Laver (1992) notes, people who write about Irish politics frequently describe Ireland as a rather peculiar place. One aspect of this peculiarity is that voters in the Republic of Ireland do not behave like their European counterparts. In particular, Irish voting patterns appear to be only weakly structured by social class. Recent contributions to the debate employing a more sophisticated categorisation of classes have led to some qualification of the 'politics without social bases' description, but still lead to the broad conclusion that any relationship which does exist between social divisions, on the one hand, and party preference, on the other, is, at most, quite marginal. In this paper we draw on data from the 1990 European Values Study to re-examine this issue. We apply a variety of models to the data, including logit regression and diagonal reference models (Sobel 1981, 1984) to explore the complex fashion in which class and political preferences are related in Ireland. We argue that the relationship between such preferences and social divisions are, in fact, greater than has been hitherto thought. In particular, we show the importance of taking into account not only social class but also class origins and class mobility in understanding the nature of political partisanship in the Republic of Ireland.

The continued salience of religious voting in the United States, Germany, and Great Britain

Conventional wisdom on party systems in advanced industrial democracies holds that modern electorates are dealigned and that social cleavages no longer structure party politics. Recent work on class cleavages has challenged this stylized fact. The analysis performed here extends this criticism to the religious-secular cleavage. Using path analysis and comparing the current electorates of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain with the early 1960s, this paper demonstrates that the religious-secular cleavage remains or has become a significant predictor of conservative vote choice. While the effects of the religious-secular cleavage on vote choice have become largely indirect, the total of the direct and indirect effects is substantial and equivalent to the effects of class and status.

What’s information got to do with it? Third-party voting in plurality systems

Although strategic voting theory predicts that the number of parties will not exceed two in single-member district plurality systems, the observed number of parties often does. Previous research suggests that the reason why people vote for third parties is that they possess inaccurate information about the parties’ relative chances of winning. However, research has yet to determine whether third-party voting persists under conditions of accurate information. In this article, we examine whether possessing accurate information prevents individuals from voting for third-placed parties in the 2005 and 2010 British elections. We find that possessing accurate information does not prevent most individuals from voting for third-placed parties and that many voters possess reasonably accurate information regarding the viability of the parties in their constituencies. These findings suggest that arguments emphasizing levels of voter information as a major explanation for why multiparty systems often emerge in plurality systems are exaggerated.

Electronic voting in the French legislative elections of 2012

This chapter presents an analysis of the unprecedented use of electronic voting by expatriates during the French 2012 legislative elections, when they elected their own representatives (referred to here as ‘deputies’), to the National Assembly in Paris for the first time, in 11 newly created overseas constituencies.
The study is presented within the broader perspective of electronic voting in France more generally, and in the historical context of extra-territorial voting by French expatriates. The authors discuss the main issues and controversies that arose during the 2012 elections, and in a final section analyse the results. The authors conclude by drawing attention to recent developments in electronic voting in France since the 2012 elections, which suggest that although there was much criticism expressed by experts of electronic voting as to the security and transparency of the system used, the official discourse that acclaimed the experience as a success, appears to have convinced its target audience.

Emotions and voting in EU referendums

There is an emerging scholarship on the emotional bases of political opinion and behaviour and, in particular, the contrasting implications of two distinct negative emotions - anger and anxiety. I apply the insights in this literature to the previously unresearched realm of the emotional bases of voting in EU referendums. I hypothesise that anxious voters rely on substantive EU issues and angry voters rely on second-order factors relating to domestic politics (partisanship and satisfaction with government). Focusing on the case of Irish voting in the Fiscal Compact referendum, and using data from a representative sample of voters, I find support for the hypotheses and discuss the implications of the findings for our understanding of the emotional conditionality of EU referendum voting. 

Potentially Voting across the Divide in Deeply Divided Places: Ethnic Catch-All Voting in Consociational Northern Ireland

I elaborate a model of cross-bloc party support in deeply divided places. The model expects that the variation in the level of electoral support that citizens in Community A have for parties in Community B is a function of citizens' evaluations of the relative ability of parties in Community B to represent the interests of all communities. This 'ethnic catch-all' model of cross-bloc party support is tested in the context of consociational Northern Ireland, using data from a representative survey conducted directly after the 2010 Westminster general election. The findings are asymmetric: the model explains Protestant support for nationalist parties but not Catholic support for unionist parties. The findings, and their implications, are discussed.

Defining Democracy: Voting Procedures in Decision-making, Elections and Governance

Book Review: Emerson, Peter, Defining Democracy: Voting Procedures in Decision-making, Elections and
Governance (2nd edn), Springer, London, 2012,