Balancing Rights in Religious Education through Collaboration and Dialogue

While the right of parents to educate their children in their religious or philosophical conviction is recognised in Human Rights instruments (e.g. CoE 1952, protocol 1), educators must also attend to the right of a child to autonomy (UN 1989, Article 12.1) and the right of liberal democratic states to reproduce values of equity and freedom. This paper argues that certain forms of inter-religious dialogue and/or inter-religious collaborative learning can assist educators in balancing these rights where religion has significant influence and power over the management of schools and/or the curriculum. It is argued that in addition to the learning benefits which may result, the use of collaboration and dialogue goes some way in addressing three philosophical criticisms of religious education: first that religiously separate and religiously based education pays insufficient attention to the rights of children and, secondly, is likely to contribute to social fragmentation; and third, pupils will lack the skills to overcome prejudice or intolerance where they have no experience of others as a result of separate schooling or from a religiously narrow curriculum, and the latter may in fact support intolerant views. A rationale is developed that asserts the value of collaboration or dialogue as a pedagogical strategy that can, to some degree, mitigate potential negative outcomes from religious education. This argument is further supported with reference to a range of empirical studies.

Lay Catholicism and Religious Policy in Cromwellian Ireland

The conquest of Ireland between 1649 and 1653 created almost as many problems as it solved for the English government of the country. Not least of these was how, if at all, the majority Catholic population was to be won over to Protestantism. This article reassesses Cromwellian religious policy towards the Catholic laity and traces its evolution up to the end of the decade, taking account also of Catholic responses to official measures. It argues that the supposed leniency of government policy has been overstated and that Catholics who refused to conform to Protestantism in fact risked heavy penalties.

Introduction: dispersed minorities and non-territorial autonomy

The concept of non-territorial autonomy gives rise to at least two important questions: the range of functional areas over which autonomy extends, and the extent to which this autonomy is indeed non-territorial. A widely used early description significantly labelled this ‘national cultural autonomy’, implying that its focus is mainly on cultural matters, such as language, religion, education and family law. In many of the cases that are commonly cited, ‘autonomy’ may not even extend this far: its most visible expression is the existence of separate electoral registers or quotas for the various groups. Part of the dilemma lies in the difficulty of devolving substantial power on a non-territorial basis: to the extent that devolved institutions are state-like, they ideally require a defined territory. Ethnic groups, however, vary in the extent to which they are territorially concentrated, and therefore in the degree to which any autonomous arrangements for them are territorial or non-territorial. This article explores the dilemma generated by this tension between ethnic geography (pattern of ethnic settlement) and political autonomy (degree of selfrule), and introduces a set of case studies where the relationship between these two features is discussed further: the Ottoman empire and its successor states, the Habsburg monarchy, the Jewish minorities of Europe, interwar Estonia, contemporary Belgium, and two indigenous peoples, the Sa´mi in Norway and the Maori in New Zealand.