Fleuve glauque : les départements de la Seine, banlieue des romans « Spécial Police » de Frédéric Dard

This paper studies the representation of suburbs as a place of anguish in the “Special Police” novels (Fleuve Noir publisher, Paris) by Frédéric Dard. This anxiety, it is argued, is what lends this collection of 25 novels some of their essential qualities, their unhealthy climate and absolute darkness. Dard’s suburbs fit into the traditions of realism; but the atmosphere, characters and plots owe to the American hardboiled school and like in film noir, space is stylized and dramatized, and often used to express a judgment of moral nature. Spatial representations in these novels are part of a critique of civilization and constitute a comment on the social modernization and public intervention in the development of the French territory in the postwar period. The novels written by Frédéric Dard from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s offer a profoundly original representation of suburban angst and what was not yet known at the time as the suburban malaise. Avoiding clichés and excessively connoted referential spaces, Dard anchor these noir novels he called “novels of the night” in landscapes that are both biographical and intertextual. The West Suburbs of Paris and what was
to become the Yvelines department are at the centre of Dard’s novelistic geography, turning into a mythical and deadly space in which is negotiated an acculturation in France of the evil and ruined world described in American noir.

Frédéric Dard: Romans de la nuit

Préface et notices accompagant la republication de sept romans parus dans la collection Spécial Police dans les années 1950 et 1960. Ces romans de suspenses psychologiques à l'atmosphère sombre, inquiétante étaient parfois désignés par les initiés sous le nom de « Romans de la nuit ».
Cette anthologie regroupe sous ce titre sept oeuvres dont l'intrigue prend la forme d'un piège à la mécanique implacable, ainsi resituées dans leur contexte culturel

. Cette mort dont tu parlais
• C'est toi le venin
• Des yeux pour pleurer
• Le Monte-charge
• L'homme de l'avenue
• La Pelouse
• Une seconde de toute beauté

Les salauds vont en enfer:Pièce en 2 actes de Frédéric Dard

Edition présentée et annotée par : Hugues Galli, Thierry Gautier et Dominique Jeannerod

Relevance and truthfulness in information correction and fusion

A general approach to information correction and fusion for belief functions is proposed, where not only may the information items be irrelevant, but sources may lie as well. We introduce a new correction scheme, which takes into account uncertain metaknowledge on the source’s relevance and truthfulness and that generalizes Shafer’s discounting operation. We then show how to reinterpret all connectives of Boolean logic in terms of source behavior assumptions with respect to relevance and truthfulness. We are led to generalize the unnormalized Dempster’s rule to all Boolean connectives, while taking into account the uncertainties pertaining to assumptions concerning the behavior of sources. Eventually, we further extend this approach to an even more general setting, where source behavior assumptions do not have to be restricted to relevance and truthfulness.We also establish the commutativity property between correction and fusion processes, when the behaviors of the sources are independent.

Gaze fixation improves the stability of expert juggling

Novice and expert jugglers employ different visuomotor strategies: whereas novices look at the balls around their zeniths, experts tend to fixate their gaze at a central location within the pattern (so-called gaze-through). A gaze-through strategy may reflect visuomotor parsimony, i.e., the use of simpler visuomotor (oculomotor and/or attentional) strategies as afforded by superior tossing accuracy and error corrections. In addition, the more stable gaze during a gaze-through strategy may result in more accurate movement planning by providing a stable base for gaze-centered neural coding of ball motion and movement plans or for shifts in attention. To determine whether a stable gaze might indeed have such beneficial effects on juggling, we examined juggling variability during 3-ball cascade juggling with and without constrained gaze fixation (at various depths) in expert performers (n = 5). Novice jugglers were included (n = 5) for comparison, even though our predictions pertained specifically to expert juggling. We indeed observed that experts, but not novices, juggled significantly less variable when fixating, compared to unconstrained viewing. Thus, while visuomotor parsimony might still contribute to the emergence of a gaze-through strategy, this study highlights an additional role for improved movement planning. This role may be engendered by gaze-centered coding and/or attentional control mechanisms in the brain.

Information aggregation and belief elicitation in experimental parimutuel betting markets

This paper studies the impact of belief elicitation on informational efficiency and individual behavior in experimental parimutuel betting markets. In one treatment, groups of eight participants, who possess a private signal about the eventual outcome, play a sequential betting game. The second treatment is identical, except that bettors are observed by eight other participants who submit incentivized beliefs about the winning probabilities of each outcome. In the third treatment, the same individuals make bets and assess the winning probabilities of the outcomes. Market probabilities more accurately reflect objective probabilities in the third than in the other two treatments. Submitting beliefs reduces the favorite-longshot bias and making bets improves the accuracy of elicited beliefs. A level-k framework provides some insights about why belief elicitation improves the capacity of betting markets to aggregate information. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Fragility of information cascades: an experimental study using elicited beliefs

This paper examines the occurrence and fragility of information cascades in two laboratory experiments. One group of low informed participants sequentially guess which of two states has been randomly chosen. In a matched pairs design, another group of high informed participants make similar guesses after having observed the guesses of the low informed participants. In the second experiment, participants' beliefs about the chosen state are elicited. In equilibrium, low informed players who observe an established pattern of identical guesses herd without regard to their private information whereas high informed players always guess according to their private information. Equilibrium behavior implies that information cascades emerge in the group of low informed participants, the belief based solely on cascade guesses is stationary, and information cascades are systematically broken by high informed participants endowed with private information contradicting the cascade guesses. Experimental results show that the behavior of low informed participants is qualitatively in line with the equilibrium prediction. Information cascades often emerge in our experiments. The tendency of low informed participants to engage in cascade behavior increases with the number of identical guesses. Our main finding is that information cascades are not fragile. The behavior of high informed participants differs markedly from the equilibrium prediction. Only one-third of laboratory cascades are broken by high informed participants endowed with private information contradicting the cascade guesses. The relative frequency of cascade breaks is 15% for the situations where five or more identical guesses are observed. Participants' elicited beliefs are strongly consistent with their own behavior and show that, unlike in equilibrium, the more cascade guesses participants observe the more they believe in the state favored by those guesses.

Parimutuel betting under asymmetric information

This paper examines simple parimutuel betting games under asymmetric information, with particular attention to differences between markets in which bets are submitted simultaneously versus sequentially. In the simultaneous parimutuel betting market, all (symmetric and asymmetric) Bayesian-Nash equilibria are generically characterized as a function of the number of bettors and the quality of their private information. There always exists a separating equilibrium, in which all bettors follow their private signals. This equilibrium is unique if the number of bettors is sufficiently large. In the sequential framework, earlier bets have information externalities, because they may reveal private information of bettors. They also have payoff externalities, because they affect the betting odds. One effect of these externalities is that the separating equilibrium disappears if the number of betting periods is sufficiently large. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.