The Un-Politics of New Public Management in Ireland

Many of the principles and indeed the rhetoric of New Public Management proved attractive to both politicians and senior bureaucrats across the developed world as a remedy for problems in policy processes. Ireland shares many features of its constitutional structures and political practices with Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, all of them early and enthusiastic adopters of NPM. Some of the organizational and procedural changes in Irish public administration do indeed bear similarities to those we would expect to see as a result of adopting principles of NPM. However, we contend that surface impressions are misleading. Drawing on a time-series database of Irish state institutions, we show that organizational changes were not necessarily driven by NPM. The absence of strong political drivers meant that reform initiatives did not fundamentally alter the configuration of the Irish public administration. Many of the problems that NPM was intended to address are only now coming under scrutiny.

Resolving conflict in bipolar societies: The fate of political settlements in Fiji and Northern Ireland

Ethnically divided societies that might be described as ‘balanced bicommunal’ (where there are two communities, each of which comes close to representing half of the population) pose a particular challenge to conventional principles of collective decision-making, and commonly threaten political stability. This article analyses the experience of two such societies – Northern Ireland and Fiji – with a view to exploring whether there are common processes in the route by which political stability has been pursued. We assess the manner in which a distinctive relationship with Great Britain and its political culture has interacted with local conditions to produce a highly competitive, bipolar party system. This leads to consideration of the devices that have been adopted in an effort to bridge the gap between the communities: the Fiji constitution as amended in 1997, and Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement of 1998. We focus, in particular, on the use of unusual (preferential voting) formulas for the election of parliamentarians and of an inclusive principle in the selection of ministers, and consider the contribution of these institutional devices to the attainment of political stability. We find that, in both cases, the intervention of forces from outside the political system had a decisive impact, though in very different ways. In addition to being underpinned by solid institutional design, for political settlements to work effectively, some minimal level of trust between rival elites is required.