Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia-Herzegovina'

What role do elections play in societies emerging from communal war and what type of institutions can serve as catalysts in deepening peace and compromise? While some analysts argue that ethnicity should be recognized through 'consociational' institutions, others maintain that 'integrative' devices - in particular, carefully crafted electoral rules - can limit or even break down the salience of ethnicity and increase the possibility for inter-ethnic accommodation. This article examines the post-war electoral experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), arguing that elections had a problematic, unintended impact on peacebuilding. First, timid integrative electoral devices were adopted in a consociational system that reifies ethnic division and complicates compromise; second, peacebuilding agencies needlessly manufactured electoral rules that backfired; third, group-based features of the BiH political system run counter to individual human rights. The article ends with suggestions for improving the electoral framework.

Peacebuilding at the Local Level: Refugee Return to Prijedor'

During the 1992-95 war, Prijedor was synonymous with mass killing, ethnic cleansing and detention camps. A decade after the end of the war, international agencies consider this town to be an example of successful foreign intervention. Thousands of Muslim displaced persons (DPs) returned to their pre-war homes, mosques have been rebuilt, and hard-line Serb nationalists have lost much influence. How could Prijedor turn from a hopeless case of ethnic violence to an example of successful intervention? This essay argues that Prijedor's (relative) success is due more to the determination of Muslim DPs than to the international peacebuilding strategy. The initial post-Dayton international intervention exacerbated the problem of internal displacement, raised ethnic tensions and left Prijedor in the hands of the same indicted war criminals responsible for the war. Against the advice of international agencies, which feared a backlash among the Bosnian Serbs, in 1998 Muslim DPs began returning home. Eventually, large-scale return improved ethnic relations and helped marginalize Bosnian Serb extremists. The essay concludes by highlighting the lessons from Prijedor, and identifies the domestic and international contribution to Prijedor's post-settlement success.

Order without law? An anatomy of Hamas security: The Executive Force (Tanfithya)

In the struggle to assert and consolidate its power, the Hamas movement of the Palestinian territories has devised several strategies for control. In recognition that control of security remains a key goal for any power-seeker, following its election victory in January 2006, Hamas entered into a fierce and ultimately successful conflict with Fatah for control of the Palestinian Authority Ministry of Interior and Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) in the Gaza Strip. One way in which Hamas was able to achieve this objective was through the creation of its own internal ‘police’ force called the Tanfithya (Executive Force or EF). This article details an anatomy of the EF and the implications of this force in terms of Hamas' confrontation with opponents and its attempts at governance. It also examines the extent to which the EF can be considered to be a model of Islamic policing and its impact on secular rivals in the Gaza Strip.