Run off Conditions on Rimming Power Law Fluids

The rimming ?ow of a power-law ?uid in the inner surface of a horizontal rotating cylinder is investigated. Exploiting the fact that the liquid layer is thin, the simplest lubrication theory is applied. The generalized run-off condition for the steady-state ?ow of the power-law liquid is derived. In the bounds implied by this condition, ?lm thickness admits a continuous solution. In the supercritical case when the mass of non-Newtonian liquid exceeds a certain value or the speed of rotation is less than an indicated limit, a discontinuous solution is possible and a hydraulic jump may occur in the steady-state regime. The location and height of the hydraulic jump for the power-law liquid is determined.

English Trade Mark Law in the Eighteenth Century: Blanchard v Hill Revisited - Another 'Case of Monopolies'?

The decision of Lord Hardwicke LC in Blanchard v Hill in 1742 is the earliest reported case on the equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief against trade mark piracy. The ambiguous manner in which the case was reported led to the decision being interpreted as either the basis of equitable jurisdiction or a denial of jurisdiction. This article seeks to establish the background to the case, what actually happened, and the immediate impact of the decision. The scene is set, however, in a parallel symbolic universe – heraldry – because in 1740, the officers of arms were confronted with a trade mark case.

Dazed and Confused: Accidental Mixtures of Goods and the Theory of Acquisition of Title

This paper explores the law of accidental mixtures of goods. It traces the development of the English rules on mixture from the seminal nineteenth century case of Spence v Union Marine Insurance Co to the present day, and compares their responses to those given by the Roman law, which always has been claimed as an influence on our jurisprudence in this area. It is argued that the different answers given by English and Roman law to essentially the same problems of title result from the differing bases of these legal systems. Roman a priori theory is contrasted with the more practical reasoning of the common law, and while both sets of rules are judged to be coherent on their own terms, it is suggested that the difference between them is reflective of a more general philosophical disagreement about the proper functioning of a legal system, and the relative importance of theoretical and pragmatic considerations.