Covenanter Politics: Evangelicalism, Political Liberalism and Ulster Presbyterians, 1798-1914

Historians of Ireland have devoted considerable attention to the Presbyterian origins of modern Irish republicanism in the 1790s and their overwhelming support for the Union with Great Britain in the 1880s. On the one hand, it has been argued that conservative politics came to dominate nineteenth-century Presbyterianism in the form of Henry Cooke who combined conservative evangelical religion with support for the established order. On the other hand, historians have long acknowledged the continued importance of liberal and radical impulses amongst Presbyterians. Few historians of the nineteenth century have attempted to bring these two stories together and to describe the relationship between the religion and politics of Presbyterians along the lines suggested by scholars of Presbyterian radicalism in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. This article argues that a distinctive form of Presbyterian evangelicalism developed in the nineteenth century that sought to bring the denomination back to the theological and spiritual priorities of seventeenth-century Scottish and Irish Presbyterianism. By doing so, it encouraged many Presbyterians to get involved in movements for reform and liberal politics. Supporters of ‘Covenanter Politics’ utilised their denominational principles and traditions as the basis for political involvement and as a rhetoric of opposition to Anglican privilege and Catholic tyranny. These could be the prime cause of Presbyterian opposition to the infringement of their rights, such as the marriage controversy and the Disruption of the Church of Scotland in the early 1840s, and they could also be employed as a language of opposition in response to broader social and political developments, such as the demands for land reform stimulated by the agricultural depression that accompanied the Famine. Despite their opposition to ascendancy, however, the Covenanter Politics of Presbyterian Liberals predisposed them towards pan-protestant unionism against the threat of ‘Rome Rule’.

Non-Trade Mark Use

Examines the extent to which the approach of the EU and UK courts towards the enforcement of trade mark rights is contrary to the public interest in the sense that it diminishes non-commercial interests and the freedom of expression. Comments on the European Court of Justice ruling in Arsenal Football Club Plc v Reed (C-206/01) on whether the trade mark rights over the name ARSENAL prevented its use on unofficial merchandise as a sign of club affiliation. Assesses the sufficiency of the infringement exceptions provided by Directive 2008/95 (Trade Mark Directive) art.6.

What is an absolute right? Deciphering absoluteness in the context of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights

The answer to the question of what it means to say that a right is absolute is often taken for granted, yet still sparks doubt and scepticism. This article investigates absoluteness further, bringing rights theory and the judicial approach on an absolute right together. A theoretical framework is set up that addresses two distinct but potentially related parameters of investigation: the first is what I have labelled the ‘applicability’ criterion, which looks at whether and when the applicability of the standard referred to as absolute can be displaced, in other words whether other considerations can justify its infringement; the second parameter, which I have labelled the ‘specification’ criterion, explores the degree to which and bases on which the content of the standard characterised as absolute is specified. This theoretical framework is then used to assess key principles and issues that arise in the Strasbourg Court’s approach to Article 3. It is suggested that this analysis allows us to explore both the distinction and the interplay between the two parameters in the judicial interpretation of the right and that appreciating the significance of this is fundamental to the understanding of and discourse on the concept of an absolute right.

Bogeymen, lunatics and fanatics: collective actions and the private enforcement of European competition law

The European desire to ensure that bearers of EU rights are adequately compensated for any infringement of these rights, particularly in cases where the harm is widely diffused, and perhaps not even noticed by those affected by it, collides with another desire: to avoid the perceived excesses of an American-style system of class actions. The excesses of these American class actions are in European discourse presented as a sort of bogeyman, which is a source of irrational fear, often presented by parental or other authority figures. But when looked at critically, the bogeyman disappears. In this paper, I examine the European (and UK) proposals for collective action. I compare them to the American regime. The flaws and purported excesses of the American regime, I argue, are exaggerated. A close, objective examination of the American regime shows this. I conclude that it is not the mythical bogeyman of a US class action that is the barrier to effective collective redress; rather, the barriers to effective, wide-ranging group actions lie within European legal culture and traditions, particularly those mandating individual control over litigation.

Commentary on Baller v. Watson (1737)

This case marks the first occasion, following the passage of the Statute of Anne 1710 (uk_1710), on which a living author sought to prevent the infringement of his own copyright before the courts, as well as the first time on which a ‘perpetual' injunction was granted to prevent the further unauthorised reproduction of the work.
The commentary describes the circumstances which led Gay to publish the work himself, by subscription, as well as the success he enjoyed (albeit posthumously) in preventing unauthorised versions of the work from being published. That a ‘perpetual' injunction was granted at the conclusion of the litigation was subsequently interpreted, by advocates of common law copyright, to suggest that, regardless of the Statute of Anne, the Lord Chancellor considered copyright to be a perpetual right.

Commentary on Beckford v. Hood (1798)

Case in which the King's Bench decided that a plaintiff could recover damages at common law for copyright infringement even though his work had not been registered with the Stationers' Company in accordance with the formalities set out in the Statute of Anne 1710 (uk_1710).
The case provides the first occasion on which the judiciary revisited and reconsidered the meaning of the House of Lords' decision in Donaldson v. Becket (uk_1774). The commentary explores the substance and significance of the decision and, in particular, the influence it had upon the manner in which the decision in Donaldson was subsequently understood throughout the early nineteenth century. The commentary also details the impact the decision had upon the extent to which publishers would adhere to the library deposit provision within the copyright legislation.