6 resultados para Impossibility
Resumo:
We exploit the analogy between the transfer of a pulse across a scattering medium and Aharonov's weak measurements to resolve the long standing paradox between the impossibility to exceed the speed of light and the seemingly "superluminal" behavior of a tunneling particle in the barrier or a photon in a "fast-light" medium. We demonstrate that superluminality occurs when the value of the duration tau spent in the barrier is uncertain, whereas when tau is known accurately, no superluminal behavior is observed. In all cases only subluminal durations contribute to the transmission which precludes faster-than-light information transfer, as observed in a recent experiment.
Resumo:
This article considers the paradox of improvisation as a gift out of time, which is completely in tune with time, subject to time. It does so through an alignment of Jacques Derrida’s philosophy and the poetic writings of Hélène Cixous. Ever mindful of the possible impossibility of improvisation in Derrida’s work, improvisation here is given over to Cixous, to the side of life, and is theorised as a type of ‘feminine writing’, as an inventive strategy that calls forth the unknown other and dreams of a gift in life that is out of time.
Resumo:
From a review of technical literature, it was not apparent if the Lagrangian or the Eulerian dispersed phase modeling approach was more valid to simulate dilute erosive slurry flow. In this study, both modeling approaches were employed and a comparative analysis of performances and accuracy between the two models was carried out. Due to an impossibility to define, for the Eulerian model already implemented in FLUENT, a set of boundary conditions consistent with the Lagrangian impulsive equations, an Eulerian dispersed phase model was integrated in the FLUENT code using subroutines and user-defined scalar equations. Numerical predictions obtained from the two different approaches for two-phase flow in a sudden expansion were compared with the measured data. Excellent agreement was attained between the predicted and observed fluid and particle velocity in the axial direction and for the kinetic energy. Erosion profiles in a sudden expansion computed using the Lagrangian scheme yielded good qualitative agreement with measured data and predicted a maximum impact angle of 29 deg at the fluid reattachment point. The Eulerian model was adversely affected by the reattachment of the fluid phase to the wall and the simulated erosion profiles were not in agreement with the Lagrangian or measured data. Furthermore, the Eulerian model under-predicted the Lagrangian impact angle at all locations except the reattachment point. © 2010 American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
Resumo:
In the throes of her mimetic exposure of the lie of phallocratic discursive unity in 'Speculum of the Other Woman', Irigaray paused on the impossibility of woman’s voice and remarked that ‘it [was] still better to speak only in riddles, allusions, hints, parables.’ Even if asked to clarify a few points. Even if people plead that they just don’t understand. After all, she said, ‘they never have understood.’ (Irigaray 1985, 143).
That the law has never understood a uniquely feminine narrative is hardly controversial, but that this erasure continues to have real and substantive consequences for justice is a reality that feminists have been compelled to remain vigilant in exposing. How does the authority of the word compound law’s exclusionary matrix? How does law remain impervious to woman’s voice and how might it hear woman’s voice? Is there capacity for a dialogic engagement between woman, parler femme, and law?
This paper will explore these questions with particular reference to the experience of women testifying to trauma during the rape trial. It will argue that a logically linked historical genealogy can be traced through which law has come to posit itself as an originary discourse by which thinking is very much conflated with being, or in other terms, law is conflated with justice. This has consequences both for women’s capacity to speak or represent the harm of rape to law, but also for law’s ability to ‘hear’ woman’s voice and objectively adjudicate in cases of rape. It will suggest that justice requires law acknowledge the presence of two distinct and different subjects and that this must be done not only at the symbolic level but also at the level of the parole, syntax and discourse.
Resumo:
According to the axiomatic literature on consensus methods, the best collective choice by one method of preference aggregation can easily be the worst by another. Are award committees, electorates, managers, online retailers, and web-based recommender systems stuck with an impossibility of rational preference aggregation? We investigate this social choice conundrum for seven social choice methods: Condorcet, Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality, the Single Transferable Vote, Coombs, and Plurality Runoff. We rely on Monte Carlo simulations for theoretical results and on twelve ballot datasets from American Psychological Association (APA) presidential elections for empirical results. Each of these elections provides partial rankings of five candidates from about 13,000 to about 20,000 voters. APA preferences are neither domain-restricted nor generated by an Impartial Culture. We find virtually no trace of a Condorcet paradox. In direct contrast with the classical social choice conundrum, competing consensus methods agree remarkably well, especially on the overall best and worst options. The agreement is also robust under perturbations of the preference prole via resampling, even in relatively small pseudosamples. We also explore prescriptive implications of our findings.
Resumo:
If there is one uncontroversial point in nuclear weapons politics it is that uninventing nuclear weapons is impossible. This article seeks to make this claim controversial by showing that it is premised on attenuated understandings of invention and the status of objects operative through familiar but problematic conceptual dualisms. The claimed impossibility of uninvention is an assertion that invention is irreversible. Drawing on “new materialism” this article produces a different understanding of invention, reinvention, and uninvention as ontologically similar practices of techno-political invention. On the basis of empirical material on the invention and re-invention of nuclear weapons, and an in-depth ethnography of laboratories inventing a portable radiation detector, both the process of invention and the “objects” themselves (weapons and detectors) are shown to be fragile and not wholly irreversible processes of assembling diverse actors (human and non-human) and provisionally stabilizing their relations. Nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented! Why not?