Philosophy, Social Hope and Democratic Criticism:Critical Theory for a Global Age

The attempt to connect philosophy and social hope has been one of the key distinguishing features of critical theory as a tradition of enquiry. This connection has been questioned forcefully from the perspective of a post-philosophical pragmatism, as articulated by Rorty. In this article I consider two strategies that have been adopted by critical theorists in seeking to reject Rorty's suggestion that we should abandon the attempt to ground social hope in philosophical reason. We consider argumentative strategies of the philosophical anthropologist and of the rational proceduralist. Once the exchanges between Rorty and these two strands of critical theory have been reconstructed and assessed, an alternative perspective emerges. It is argued that philosophical reasoning best helps to sustain social hope in a rapidly changing world when we consider it in terms of the practice of democratic criticism.

Alasdair MacIntyre and the Hope for a Politics of Virtuous Interdependence

Rebellion, philosophic and political, impels the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. Neither of the left nor the right, he treads a borderline path between conservatism and radicalism in holding to a socialist Thomistic Aristotelianism underpinned by a deliberative ‘ethic of care’ that is implacably opposed to modernity and the advanced capitalist nation-state. The depth of this opposition arouses strong opinions in friend and foe alike. To some he is an eminently dispensable reactionary whose sole consistent feature is an inexplicable ‘hatred of liberal individualism’ (Lessnoff 1999: 4). To others he appears a revolutionary enunciating a departure capable of legitimating the activities of ordinary persons so ‘that previously isolated struggles might be transformed into a new class war of attrition’ (Knight 1996: 896). However, neither interpretation rings true. MacIntyre does develop a cogent critique of the present, but this critique points in directions towards which no politics could hope to move.

The good our field can hope to do, the harm it should avoid

This paper tries to achieve a balanced view of the ethical issues raised by emotion-oriented technology as it is, rather than as it might be imagined. A high proportion of applications seem ethically neutral. Uses in entertainment and allied areas do no great harm or good. Empowering professions may do either, but regulatory systems already exist. Ethically positive aspirations involve mitigating problems that already exist by supporting humans in emotion-related judgments, by replacing technology that treats people in dehumanized and/or demeaning ways, and by improving access for groups who struggle with existing interfaces. Emotion-oriented computing may also contribute to revaluing human faculties other than pure intellect. Many potential negatives apply to technology as a whole. Concerns specifically related to emotion involve creating a lie, by simulate emotions that the systems do not have, or promoting mechanistic conceptions of emotion. Intermediate issues arise where more general problems could be exacerbated-helping systems to sway human choices or encouraging humans to choose virtual worlds rather than reality. "SIIF" systems (semi-intelligent information filters) are particularly problematic. These use simplified rules to make judgments about people that are complex, and have potentially serious consequences. The picture is one of balances to recognize and negotiate, not uniform good or evil. © 2010-2012 IEEE.

Editors' Introduction: Political Theory and Social Hope

This introduction sets in a broad research context the significnance of the research contribution of this special issue of the journal, on the theme of 'political theory and social hope'.