The death blow to unlimited liability in Victorian Britain: The City of Glasgow failure

In 1878, one of Britain's largest banks, the City of Glasgow Bank, collapsed, leaving a huge deficit between its assets and liabilities. As this bank, similar to many other contemporary British banks, had unlimited liability, its failure was accompanied by the bankruptcy of the vast majority of its stockholders. It is generally believed that the collapse of this depository institution revealed the extent to which ownership in large joint-stock banks had been diffused to investors of very modest means. It is also believed that the failure resulted in bank shareholders dumping their shares unto the market. Our evidence, garnered from ownership records, trading data, and stock prices, offers no support for these widely held beliefs. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The Masculine Habitus as 'Distributed Cognition': A Case Study of 5- to 6-Year-Old Boys in an English Inner-City, Multi-Ethnic Primary School

This article provides a case study demonstrating the active role that 5- to 6-year-old boys in an English inner-city, multi-ethnic primary school play in the appropriation and reproduction of their masculine identities. It is argued that the emphasis on physicality, violence and racism found among the boys cannot be understood without reference to the immediate contexts of the local community and the school within which they are located. In making this argument the article draws upon and applies the concept of the habitus and develops this with the notion of 'distributed cognition' as proposed in sociocultural theory. Some of the implications of this analysis for working with boys in early years settings are discussed in the conclusion.

Much Ado About Nothing: The Limitation of Liability and the Market for 19th century Irish Bank Stock

Abstract Limited liability is widely believed to be a prerequisite for the emergence of an active and liquid securities market because the transactions costs associated with trading ownership of unlimited liability firms are viewed as prohibitive. In this article, we examine the trading of shares in an Irish bank, which limited its liability in 1883. Using this bank’s archives, we assemble a time series of trading data, which we test for structural breaks. Our results suggest that the move to limited liability had a negligible impact upon the trading of this bank’s shares.

The Trading of Unlimited Liability Bank Shares in Nineteenth Century Ireland: The Bagehot Hypothesis

In the mid-1820s, banks became the first businesses in Great Britain and Ireland to be allowed to form freely on an unlimited liability joint-stock basis. Walter Bagehot warned that their shares would ultimately be owned by widows, orphans, and other impecunious individuals. Another hypothesis is that the governing bodies of these banks, constrained by special legal restrictions on share trading, acted effectively to prevent such shares being transferred to the less wealthy. We test both conjectures using the archives of an Irish joint-stock bank. The results do not support Bagehot's hypothesis.