Banking in Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British Banking Stability, 1800 to the Present

Can the lessons of the past help us to prevent another banking collapse in the future? This is the first book to tell the story of the rise and fall of British banking stability in the past two centuries, and it sheds new light on why banking systems crash and the factors underpinning banking stability. John Turner shows that there were only two major banking crises in Britain during this time: the crisis of 1825–6 and the Great Crash of 2007–8. Although there were episodic bouts of instability in the interim, the banking system was crisis-free. Why was the British banking system stable for such a long time and why did the British banking system implode in 2008? In answering these questions, the book explores the long-run evolution of bank regulation, the role of the Bank of England, bank rescues and the need to hold shareholders to account.

Deriving the Railway Mania

This article argues that the promotion boom which occurred in the railway industry during the mid 1840s was amplified by the issue of derivative-like assets, which let investors take highly leveraged positions in the shares of new railway companies. The partially paid shares which the new railway companies issued allowed investors to obtain exposure to an asset by paying only a small initial deposit. The consequence of this arrangement was that investor returns were substantially amplified, and many schemes could be financed simultaneously. However, when investors were required to make further payments it put a negative downward pressure on prices.

New Financial Elites, or Financial Dualism in Historical perspective? An Extended Reply to Folkman, Froud, Johal and Williams

This paper challenges the recent suggestion that a new financial elite has evolved which is able to capture substantial profit shares for itself. Specifically, it questions the assumption that new groups of financial intermediaries have increased in significance primarily because there is evidence that various types of financial speculators have played a similarly extensive role at several junctures of economic development. The paper then develops the alternative hypothesis that, rather than being a recent development, the rise of these financial intermediaries is a cyclical phenomenon which is linked to specific regimes of capital accumulation. The hypothesis is underpinned by historical data from the US National Income and Product Accounts for the period from 1930 to 2000, which suggest that the activities of `mainstream' financial intermediaries have been accompanied by the frequently countercyclical activities of a `speculative' sector of security and commodity brokers. Based on the combination of this qualitative and quantitative evidence, the paper concludes that the rise of a speculative financial sector is a potentially recurrent phenomenon which is linked to periods of economic restructuring and turmoil.

Interlocking directorates and conflicts of interest: The Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging, Müller & Co. and the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s

How can interlocking directorates cause financial instability for universal banks? A detailed history of the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeninging in the 1920s answers this question in a case study. This large commercial bank adopted a new German-style universal banking business model from the early 1910s, sharing directors with the firms it financed as a means of controlling its interests. Then, in 1924, it required assistance from the Dutch state in order to survive a bank run brought on by public concerns over its close ties with Müller & Co., a trading conglomerate that suffered badly in the economic downturn of the early 1920s. Using a new narrative history combined with an interpretive model, this article shows how the interlocking directorates between the bank and this major client, and in particular the direction of influence of these interlocks, resulted in a conflict of interest that could not be easily overcome.

Law, Politics and Financial Development: The Great Reversal of the U.K. Corporate Debt Market

This article examines the role of creditor protection in the development of the U.K. corporate bond market. This market grew rapidly in the late nineteenth century, but in the twentieth century it experienced a reversal, albeit with a short-lived post-1945 renaissance. Such was the extent of the reversal that the market from the 1970s onwards was smaller than it had been in 1870. We find that law does not explain the variation in the size of this market over time. Alternatively, our evidence suggests that inflation and taxation policies were major drivers of this market in the post-1945 era. Copyright © The Economic History Association 2013

Income ineqaulity from 1960-2012: a brief time-series history of capital and labour

This commentary examines two principal forms of inequality and their evolution since the 1960s: the division of national income between capital and labour, and the share of total income held by the top 1 per cent of earners. Trends are linked to current discussions of inequality drivers such as financialisation, and a brief time-series analysis of the effects of trade and financial sector growth on top incomes is presented.

Socialized credit and the working-class family economy: a comparative history of Britain and France 1900-2000

This paper provides a comparative analysis of working class consumer credit in Britain and France from the early twentieth century through to the 1980s. It indicates a number of similarities between the two nations in the earlier part of the period: in particular, in the operation of doorstep credit systems. For the British case study, we explore consumer finance offered by credit drapers (sometimes known as tallymen) whilst in France the paper explores a similar system that functioned in the coalmining communities around the city of Lens. Both methods operated on highly socialised relationships that established the trust on which credit was offered and long-term creditor/borrower relationships established. In the second part of the paper, we analyse the different trajectories taken in post-war France and Britain in this area of working class credit. In France this form of socialized credit gradually dwindled due to factors such as ‘Bancarisation’, which saw the major banks emerge as modern bureaucratized providers of credit for workers and their families. In contrast, in Britain the tallymen (and other related forms of doorstep credit providers) were offered a new lease of life in the 1960s and 1970s. This was a period during which British credit providers utilised multiple methods to evade the hire purchase controls put in place by post-war governments. Thus, whilst the British experience was one of fragmented consumer loan types (including the continuation of doorstep credit), the French experience (like elsewhere in Europe) was one of greater consolidation. The paper concludes by reflecting on the role of these developments in the creation of differential experiences of credit inclusion/exclusion in the two nations and the impact of this on financial inequality.

History Matters: How International Regimes Become Entrenched—and Why We Suffer for It

International regimes are composite historical constructions. They are built-up through bricolage, as resource-strapped officials combine operational capacities, frequently turning to outside assistance. Who wins and loses—and why—when organisations are added or subtracted? What happens when inter-organisational relations are recalibrated? Why do regimes cohere as they do? By comparing the development of financial-regulatory regimes and probing other illustrative cases, I offer an explanatory framework that emphasizes the importance of timing and sequencing in determining outcomes. Thinking beyond interstate network effects and switching costs, I distil new data and theoretical insights into how and why temporality matters in global politics. I find that time structures the strategic bargaining contexts that mediate the intense distributional struggles between organisations driving key institutional reforms. The explanatory power of this framework upsets conventional wisdom whereby the distribution of state power, and the dynamics of interstate bargaining, are assumed the critical sources of institutional reform.