Information Disclosure, Market Discipline and the Management of Bank Capital: Evidence from the Chinese Financial Sector

Is there evidence that market forces effectively discipline risk management behaviour within Chinese financial institutions? This study analyses information from a comprehensive sample of Chinese banks over the 1998-2008 period. Market discipline is captured through the impact of four sets of factors namely, market concentration, interbank deposits, information disclosure, and ownership structure. We find some evidence of a market disciplining effect in that: (i) higher (lower) levels of market concentration lead banks to operate with a lower (higher) capital buffer; (ii) joint-equity banks that disclose more information to the public maintain larger capital ratios; (iii) full state ownership reduces the sensitivity of changes in a bank's capital buffer to its level of risk;(iv) banks that release more transparent financial information hold more capital against their non-performing loans. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

The diversification and financial performance of US credit unions

For US credit unions, revenue from non-interest sources has increased significantly in recent years. We investigate the impact of revenue diversification on financial performance for the period 1993–2004. The impact of a change in strategy that alters the share of non-interest income is decomposed into a direct exposure effect, reflecting the difference between interest and non-interest bearing activities, and an indirect exposure effect which reflects the effect of the institution’s own degree of diversification. On both risk-adjusted and unadjusted returns measures, a positive direct exposure effect is outweighed by a negative indirect exposure effect for all but the largest credit unions. This may imply that similar diversification strategies are not appropriate for large and small credit unions. Small credit unions should eschew diversification and continue to operate as simple savings and loan institutions, while large credit unions should be encouraged to exploit new product opportunities around their core expertise.

'Trusting the numbers': mineral prospecting, raising finance and the governance of knowledge

Mineral prospecting and raising finance for ‘junior’ mining firms has historically been regarded as a speculative activity. For the regulators of securities markets upon which ‘junior’ mining companies seek to raise capital, a perennial problem has been handling not only the indeterminacy of scientific claims, but also the social basis of epistemic practices. This paper examines the production of a system of public warrant and associated knowledge practices intended to enable investors to differentiate between ‘destructive’ and ‘productive’ varieties of financial speculation. It traces the use of the notion of ‘disclosure’ in constructing and legitimizing the ‘juniors’ market in Canada. It argues that though the work of ‘economics’ may be necessary in the construction of markets, it is by no means sufficient. Attention must also be given to the ways in which legal models of ‘the free-market’ can be translated and constantly re-worked across the sites and spaces of regulatory practice, animating the geographies of markets.

Private equity and entrepreneurial management in management buy-outs

Critics claim that short-term profit orientation and high deal price strategies of private equity (PE) firms can negatively affect the ability of management buyouts to initiate and sustain entrepreneurial management. This study investigates this claim by comparing effects of majority PE backed and other buy-outs at different levels of financial leverage on post buy-out increases in entrepreneurial management. We propose that PE can be used as an organizational refocusing device that simultaneously increases entrepreneurial and administrative management. We find that majority PE-backed buy-outs significantly increase entrepreneurial management practices. Furthermore, the increased financial leverage positively affects administrative management in management buy-outs. However, the effect of high financial leverage is larger for majority PE-backed buy-outs. These results support the notion that PE firms help buy-out companies develop ambidextrous organizational change: i.e. simultaneously develop entrepreneurial and administrative management practices. The findings have important implications for practitioners and policy makers.

Law, Politics and Financial Development: The Great Reversal of the U.K. Corporate Debt Market

This article examines the role of creditor protection in the development of the U.K. corporate bond market. This market grew rapidly in the late nineteenth century, but in the twentieth century it experienced a reversal, albeit with a short-lived post-1945 renaissance. Such was the extent of the reversal that the market from the 1970s onwards was smaller than it had been in 1870. We find that law does not explain the variation in the size of this market over time. Alternatively, our evidence suggests that inflation and taxation policies were major drivers of this market in the post-1945 era. Copyright © The Economic History Association 2013

'Trusting the numbers': mineral prospecting, raising finance and the governance of knowledge

Mineral prospecting and raising finance for ‘junior’ mining firms has historically been regarded as a speculative activity. For the regulators of securities markets upon which ‘junior’ mining companies seek to raise capital, a perennial problem has been handling not only the indeterminacy of scientific claims, but also the social basis of epistemic practices. This paper examines the production of a system of public warrant and associated knowledge practices intended to enable investors to differentiate between ‘destructive’ and ‘productive’ varieties of financial speculation. It traces the use of the notion of ‘disclosure’ in constructing and legitimizing the ‘juniors’ market in Canada. It argues that though the work of ‘economics’ may be necessary in the construction of markets, it is by no means sufficient. Attention must also be given to the ways in which legal models of ‘the free-market’ can be translated and constantly re-worked across the sites and spaces of regulatory practice, animating the geographies of markets.

Docking the value of pigmeat? Prevalence and financial implications of welfare lesions in Irish slaughter pigs.

Expansion of the meat inspection process to incorporate animal-based welfare measurements could contribute towards significant improvements in pig (Sus scrofa domesticus) welfare and farm profitability. This study aimed to determine the prevalence of different welfare-related lesions on the carcase and their relationship with carcase condemnations (CC) and carcase weight (CW). The financial implications of losses associated with CC and CW reductions related to the welfare lesions were also estimated. Data on tail lesions, loin bruising and bursitis, CW and condemnation/trimming outcome (and associated weights) were collected for 3,537slaughter pigs (mean [± SEM] carcase weight: 79.2 [± 8.82] kg). Overall, 72.5% of pigs had detectable tail lesions, whilst 16.0 and 44.0% were affected by severe loin bruising and hind limb bursitis, respectively. There were 2.5% of study carcases condemned and a further 3.3% were trimmed. The primary cause of CC was abscessation. While tail lesion severity did not increase the risk of abscessation, it was significantly associated with CC. Male pigs had a higher risk of tail lesions and of CC. The financial loss to producers associated with CC and trimmings was estimated at €1.10 per study pig. CW was reduced by up to 12 kg in cases of severe tail lesions. However, even mild lesions were associated with a significant reduction in CW of 1.2 kg. The value of the loss in potential CW associated with tail lesions was €0.59 per study pig. Combined with losses attributable to CC and trimmings this represented a loss of 43% of the profit margin per pig, at the time of the study, attributable to tail biting. These findings illustrate the magnitude of the impact of tail biting on pig welfare and on profitability of the pig industry. They also emphasise the potential contribution that the inclusion of welfare parameters at meat inspection could make to pig producers in informing herd health and welfare management plans.

Global Systemic Risk and International Regulatory Coordination: Squaring Sovereignty and Financial Stability

In recent years much attention has been given to systemic risk and maintaining financial stability. Much of the focus, rightly, has been on market failures and the role of regulation in addressing them. This article looks at the role of domestic policies and government actions as sources of global instability. The global financial system is built upon global markets controlled by national financial and macroeconomic policies. In this context, regulatory asymmetries, diverging policy preferences, and government failures add a further dimension to global systemic risk not present at the national level.
Systemic risk is a result of the interplay between two independent variables: an underlying trigger event, in this analysis a domestic policy measure, and a transmission channel. The solution to systemic risk requires tackling one of these variables. In a domestic setting, the centralization of regulatory power into one single authority makes it easier to balance the delicate equilibrium between enhancing efficiency and reducing instability. However, in a global financial system in which national financial policies serve to maximize economic welfare, regulators will be confronted with difficult policy and legal tradeoffs.
We investigate the role that financial regulation plays in addressing domestic policy failures and in controlling the danger of global financial interdependence. To do so we analyse global financial interconnectedness, and explain its role in transmitting instability; we investigate the political economy dynamics at the origin of regulatory asymmetries and government failures; and we discuss the limits of regulation.