Ambiguity, social opinion and the use of common property resources

In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation, can be used as the foundation of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our approach sheds light on the international environmental crisis and the relevant ongoing international negotiations. We conclude that social opinion formation in most cases has a significant impact on equilibrium common property resource usage.

Information aggregation and belief elicitation in experimental parimutuel betting markets

This paper studies the impact of belief elicitation on informational efficiency and individual behavior in experimental parimutuel betting markets. In one treatment, groups of eight participants, who possess a private signal about the eventual outcome, play a sequential betting game. The second treatment is identical, except that bettors are observed by eight other participants who submit incentivized beliefs about the winning probabilities of each outcome. In the third treatment, the same individuals make bets and assess the winning probabilities of the outcomes. Market probabilities more accurately reflect objective probabilities in the third than in the other two treatments. Submitting beliefs reduces the favorite-longshot bias and making bets improves the accuracy of elicited beliefs. A level-k framework provides some insights about why belief elicitation improves the capacity of betting markets to aggregate information. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Learning, fatigue and preference formation in discrete choice experiments

While the repeated nature of Discrete Choice Experiments is advantageous from a sampling efficiency perspective, patterns of choice may differ across the tasks, due, in part, to learning and fatigue. Using probabilistic decision process models, we find in a field study that learning and fatigue behavior may only be exhibited by a small subset of respondents. Most respondents in our sample show preference and variance stability consistent with rational pre-existent and
well formed preferences. Nearly all of the remainder exhibit both learning and fatigue effects. An important aspect of our approach is that it enables learning and fatigue effects to be explored, even though they were not envisaged during survey design or data collection.

Stability in a Network Economy: The Role of Institutions

We consider an economy in which agents are embedded in a network of potential value-generating relationships. Agents are assumed to be able to participate in three types of economic interactions: Autarkic self-provision; bilateral interaction; and multilateral collaboration through endogenously provided platforms.
We introduce two stability concepts and provide sufficient and necessary conditions on the network structure that guarantee existence, in cases of the absence of externalities, link-based externalities and crowding externalities. We show that institutional arrangements based on socioeconomic roles and leadership guarantee stability. In particular, the stability of more complex economic outcomes requires more strict and complex institutional rules to govern economic interactions. We investigate strict social hierarchies, tiered leadership structures and global market places.

Eliciting and estimating valid subjective probabilities: An experimental investigation of the Exchangeability Method.

Using a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether incentive compatibility affects subjective probabilities elicited via the exchangeability method (EM), an elicitation technique consisting of several chained questions. We hypothesize that subjects who are aware of the chaining strategically behave and provide invalid subjective probabilities, while subjects who are not aware of the chaining state their real beliefs and provide valid subjective probabilities. The validity of subjective probabilities is investigated using de Finetti's notion of coherence, under which probability estimates are valid if and only if they obey all axioms of probability theory.
Four experimental treatments are designed and implemented. Subjects are divided into two initial treatment groups: in the first, they are provided with real monetary incentives, and in the second, they are not. Each group is further sub-divided into two treatment groups, in the first, the chained structure of the experimental design is made clear to the subjects, while, in the second, the chained structure is hidden by randomizing the elicitation questions.
Our results suggest that subjects provided with monetary incentives and randomized questions provide valid subjective probabilities because they are not aware of the chaining which undermines the incentive compatibility of the exchangeability method.

New Organizational Leadership: Nonstate Actors in Global Economic Governance

States and international organizations have found irresistible cause in a globalizing world to coopt nonstate actors (NGOs, private standard setters and so forth) to manage the manifold problems arising under their stretched mandates and resources. The pooling of capacities in the pursuit of common goals seems perfectly sensible. Yet although the strategy of cooptation has become a policy of choice, policy makers often lack full knowledge of its implications. As Philip Selznick first showed, cooptation can have unintended consequences, shifting leadership from one organization to another. We place this fertile insight in a better specified analytical framework. That is, one capable of explaining when and how leadership shifts occur and where the status quo leaders will remain at the helm. Using original interview data and structured focused comparisons to test the framework, we reveal dramatic variation in leadership changes following the cooptation of outside actors in global financial and environmental governance.