Dynamic control of laser driven proton beams by exploiting self-generated, ultrashort electromagnetic pulses

As part of the ultrafast charge dynamics initiated by high intensity laser irradiations of solid targets,high amplitude EM pulses propagate away from the interaction point and are transported along anystalks and wires attached to the target. The propagation of these high amplitude pulses along a thinwire connected to a laser irradiated target was diagnosed via the proton radiography technique,measuring a pulse duration of 20 ps and a pulse velocity close to the speed of light. The strongelectric field associated with the EM pulse can be exploited for controlling dynamically the protonbeams produced from a laser-driven source. Chromatic divergence control of broadband laser drivenprotons (upto 75% reduction in divergence of >5 MeV protons) was obtained by winding the supportingwire around the proton beam axis to create a helical coil structure. In addition to providingfocussing and energy selection, the technique has the potential to post-accelerate the transiting protonsby the longitudinal component of the curved electric field lines produced by the helical coil lens.

Threat Analysis of BlackEnergy Malware for Synchrophasor based Real-time Control and Monitoring in Smart Grid

The BlackEnergy malware targeting critical infrastructures has a long history. It evolved over time from a simple DDoS platform to a quite sophisticated plug-in based malware. The plug-in architecture has a persistent malware core with easily installable attack specific modules for DDoS, spamming, info-stealing, remote access, boot-sector formatting etc. BlackEnergy has been involved in several high profile cyber physical attacks including the recent Ukraine power grid attack in December 2015. This paper investigates the evolution of BlackEnergy and its cyber attack capabilities. It presents a basic cyber attack model used by BlackEnergy for targeting industrial control systems. In particular, the paper analyzes cyber threats of BlackEnergy for synchrophasor based systems which are used for real-time control and monitoring functionalities in smart grid. Several BlackEnergy based attack scenarios have been investigated by exploiting the vulnerabilities in two widely used synchrophasor communication standards: (i) IEEE C37.118 and (ii) IEC 61850-90-5. Specifically, the paper addresses reconnaissance, DDoS, man-in-the-middle and replay/reflection attacks on IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5. Further, the paper also investigates protection strategies for detection and prevention of BlackEnergy based cyber physical attacks.