Understanding how animals fight with Lloyd Morgan's canon

Various game theory models have been used to explain animal contests. Here we attend to the presumed cognitive abilities required by these models with respect to information gathering and consequent decision making. Some, such as the hawk/dove game and self-assessment models require very limited cognitive ability. By contrast, the broadly accepted sequential assessment model requires that contestants know their own abilities and compare them with information gathered about their opponent to determine which has the greater resource-holding power. However, evidence for assessment of relative abilities is sparse and we suggest that this complex ability is probably beyond most animals. Indeed, perceptual limitations may restrict information about an individual's own displays and thus preclude comparison. We take a parsimonious view and conclude that simple summation of causal factors accounts for changes in fight motivation without requiring mutual evaluation of relative abilities. © 2012 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.

Towards a Normative Defence of Provocation in England and Ireland

This article compares, in the light of the House of Lords’ decision in R v Smith (Morgan James), the English and Irish approaches to the objective test in provocation. Though the law on this point has developed in radically different directions as between England and Ireland, both jurisdictions demonstrate a profound dissatisfaction with the objective test in its traditional formulation combined with a reluctance to dispense with it altogether. It is suggested that Lord Hoffmann’s approach in Morgan Smith, by drawing out the essentially normative function of the objective test, provides a useful way forward for the law on both sides of the Irish Sea.