2 resultados para D21 - Firm Behavior
Resumo:
In this paper, we attempt to reconcile contingency and institutional fit approaches concerning the organization-environment relationship. While prior scholarly research has examined both theories and compared their impacts on organizational fit and performance, we lay the groundwork for a meta-fit approach by investigating how contingency and institutional fit interact to influence firm performance. We test our theoretical framework using a dataset of 3,259 respondents from 1,904 companies regarding task environmental demands and institutional demands on organizational design across a broad range of industries and firm size classes. Our results show that contingency and institutional fit provide complementary and interdependent explanations of firm performance. Importantly, our findings indicate that for firms under conditions of “quasi-fit” rather than perfect contingency fit or optimal institutional fit, improvements in contingency and/or institutional fit will result in better performance. However, firms with high contingency fit are less vulnerable to deviation from institutional fit in the formation of firm performance, while firms with perfect institutional fit will slightly decrease their performance when they strive to achieve contingency fit.
Resumo:
The control and coordination of a network of geographically and culturally dispersed subsidiaries is one of the most prominent challenges in international management. However, many empirical findings on the effectiveness of various control mechanisms and combinations thereof are still counterintuitive. This study uses longitudinal case studies and cross-sectional interview data to extend control theory by examining why, how, and in what sequence large multinational firms (MNCs) implement controls in their networks of foreign subsidiaries. Our analysis draws from literature on institutional theory, embeddedness, and organizational power to demonstrate that MNC headquarters need to overcome institutional duality when implementing their controls abroad. We find that headquarters do so by using social controls, primarily as a way of legitimizing and institutionalizing their process and output controls that are implemented subsequently.