Sticks, Stones and Words: Emotional Harm and the English Criminal Law

This article discusses the rule that criminal liability does not normally attach for the causing of emotional harm or mental distress in the absence of proof of a 'recognised psychiatric injury'. It considers what is involved in the diagnosis of psychiatric injury, and to what extent the difference between such injury and 'ordinary' mental distress is one of degree rather than one of kind. It reviews the situations in which the law already criminalises the infliction of emotional harm without proof of psychiatric injury, and assesses the policy arguments for drawing the distinction in the normal case. The article concludes that the law can and should adopt a more flexible approach to cases of this sort.

Personal Injury Liability in Sport: Emerging Trends

Violent play during the course of a game or sport is not a new phenomenon; accompanying legal proceedings are. This article considers personal injury liability for injuries inflicted by a participant upon an opponent during a sporting pursuit. The jurisdictional focus is on England and Wales. The sporting emphasis of the article is on competitive, body contact games. The legal emphasis is on the tort of negligence. Analogous to the law of criminal assault, breach of "implied sporting consent" or the volenti of the claimant will be seen as central in application, as assessed through a number of objective criteria, including the skill level of the injuring party and whether that defendant was acting in "reckless disregard" of the claimant's safety. These criteria or evidential guidelines, which emerge from a careful doctrinal analysis of the relevant case law, are seen as crucial to the examination of the appropriate degree of care in negligence within the prevailing circumstances of sport. The article also searches for some theoretical coherency within the case law, premising it on Fletcher's idea of reciprocal risk-taking. In addition, the underlying policy-related issue of sport's social utility is discussed, as are practical matters relating to vicarious liability, insurance and the measure of damages for "lost sporting opportunity". Moreover, it will be shown that personal injury claims relating to sports participant liability now extend to a consideration of the duties of coaches, referees, sports governing bodies and schools. Finally, this article is set against the backdrop of an apparently spiralling "compensation culture" and the concomitant threat that that "blame culture" poses for the future promotion, operation and administration of sport.

Criminal Conversations: Rogues, Words and the World in the Work of Daniel Defoe

Even as Daniel Defoe's roguish protagonists notably Moll Flanders and Colonel Jack try to separate themselves from illicit itinerants, they are implicated further in deviance. Moll and Jack both embody and exploit ambiguous moral and spatial arrangements, and use hybrid linguistic formulations, all of which collocate the roguish and the reputable. By brilliantly realizing this interpenetration of words and worlds, Defoe problematises eighteenth-century efforts to demarcate the illicit and itinerant along the lines of space, rank, gender and language. Such efforts facilitated deviant mobility as much as they demonised it. Much scholarship has attended to Defoe's representations of criminality and poverty. This article develops such research to re-position him in a tradition of rogue-writing that stylishly problematises normative discriminatory practices.

The Effect of Human RIghts on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?

This article examines the contribution which the European Court of Human Rights has made to the development of common evidentiary processes across the common law and civil law systems of criminal procedure in Europe. It is argued that the continuing use of terms such as 'adversarial' and 'inquisitorial' to describe models of criminal proof and procedure has obscured the genuinely transformative nature of the Court's jurisprudence. It is shown that over a number of years the Court has been steadily developing a new model of proof that is better characterised as 'participatory' than as 'adversarial' or 'inquisitorial'. Instead of leading towards a convergence of existing 'adversarial' and 'inquisitorial' models of proof, this is more likely to lead towards a realignment of existing processes of proof which nonetheless allows plenty of scope for diverse application in different institutional and cultural settings.