Law in Northern Ireland

This is the latest edition of a book which is the standard introductory text for newcomers to the legal system of Northern Ireland. After explaining how law-making has evolved in Northern Ireland, particularly since the partition of Ireland in 1921, the book devotes separate chapters to the current constitutional position of Northern Ireland, to the making of legislation and case law for that jurisdiction, and to the influence of EU and European Convention law. It examines the principles of public law applying in Northern Ireland and outlines the role of some of the public authorities there. It then moves to chapters on criminal law and criminal procedure, followed by chapters on private law and civil procedure. It ends by examining the legal professions, legal education, the legal aid regimes and legal costs. There are also appendices with sample sources of law. Throughout the book, the focus is on conveying in comprehensible terms the essential features of this small, but historically very controversial, legal jurisdiction.

Dazed and Confused: Accidental Mixtures of Goods and the Theory of Acquisition of Title

This paper explores the law of accidental mixtures of goods. It traces the development of the English rules on mixture from the seminal nineteenth century case of Spence v Union Marine Insurance Co to the present day, and compares their responses to those given by the Roman law, which always has been claimed as an influence on our jurisprudence in this area. It is argued that the different answers given by English and Roman law to essentially the same problems of title result from the differing bases of these legal systems. Roman a priori theory is contrasted with the more practical reasoning of the common law, and while both sets of rules are judged to be coherent on their own terms, it is suggested that the difference between them is reflective of a more general philosophical disagreement about the proper functioning of a legal system, and the relative importance of theoretical and pragmatic considerations.

Article 6 ECHR, Civil Rights and the Enduring Role of the Common Law

This article examines the role that the common law has played in Human Rights Act 1998 case law on the protection of 'civil rights' within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. Focusing on Article 6 ECHR's 'disclosure' and 'full jurisdiction' requirements, it highlights an increasingly nuanced relationship between the ECHR and common law in cases under and outside the Human Rights Act 1998. Although the general pattern within the case law has been one of domestic court fidelity to the ECHR - something that is wholly consistent with section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 - the article notes areas in which the courts have been reluctant to adapt common law principles, as well as instances of common law protections exceeding those available under Article 6 ECHR. The article suggests that such lines of reasoning reveal a robustness within the common law that brings a multi-dimensional quality to the Human Rights Act 1998. It also suggests that such robustness can be analysed with reference to 'common law constitutionalism' and a corresponding imagery of 'dialogue' between the domestic courts and European Court of Human Rights.

On convergence with hiccups: recent amendments to Poland's competition law

Discusses the amendments to the Polish Competition Act 2007 adopted in June 2014 which aim to enhance the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, including the introduction of: (1) civil fines for individuals; (2) a "leniency plus" programme based on the US model; (3) a settlement procedure; and (4) extended inspection powers for the Competition Authority. Assesses the likely effectiveness of the reforms.

The Effect of Human RIghts on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?

This article examines the contribution which the European Court of Human Rights has made to the development of common evidentiary processes across the common law and civil law systems of criminal procedure in Europe. It is argued that the continuing use of terms such as 'adversarial' and 'inquisitorial' to describe models of criminal proof and procedure has obscured the genuinely transformative nature of the Court's jurisprudence. It is shown that over a number of years the Court has been steadily developing a new model of proof that is better characterised as 'participatory' than as 'adversarial' or 'inquisitorial'. Instead of leading towards a convergence of existing 'adversarial' and 'inquisitorial' models of proof, this is more likely to lead towards a realignment of existing processes of proof which nonetheless allows plenty of scope for diverse application in different institutional and cultural settings.

Sex Offender Registration: Some Observations on ‘Megan’s Law’ and the Sex Offenders Act 1997

“Megan’s Law” in the United States and Part 1 of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 in the United Kingdom, make provision for the creation of a register which will record the names and addresses of all persons convicted or cautioned for a sexual offence. Arguments expounded in favour of the legislation include the supposedly high recidivism among sex offenders, the inadequacy of supervision provisions, and the resulting need to ‘track’ the dangerous offender for public protection. In practice, however, there are a plethora of obstacles, such as cost and inadequate policing resources, which may impede its effectiveness in aiding law enforcement and reduce it to symbolic significance only. In addition, there are an array of ethical objections to the legislation, such as it breaches civil liberties and constitutes ‘double jeopardy’, which may prevent meaningful imposition.

Jamming the Law: Improvisational Theatre and the 'Spontaneity' of Judgment

Modern ‘nonscripted’ theatre (NST) clearly owes much to improvisation. Perhaps less obviously, and more surprisingly, so too does modern law. In this article I will contend that, despite all the rules of evidence and procedure, statutes and legal precedents that fundamentally govern the decisions and actions of a judge, it is only through ‘spontaneity’ that judgment can take place. This claim may appear strange to those well-versed in the common law tradition which proceeds on the basis of past legal decisions, or reason where no precedent exists. NST, on the other hand, is assumed to rely heavily on the unprecedented and unreasoned. Therefore, when the public watches a NST production, it places its faith in the belief that what is being observed is entirely new and is being produced ‘on the spur of the moment’.