Information Disclosure, Market Discipline and the Management of Bank Capital: Evidence from the Chinese Financial Sector

Is there evidence that market forces effectively discipline risk management behaviour within Chinese financial institutions? This study analyses information from a comprehensive sample of Chinese banks over the 1998-2008 period. Market discipline is captured through the impact of four sets of factors namely, market concentration, interbank deposits, information disclosure, and ownership structure. We find some evidence of a market disciplining effect in that: (i) higher (lower) levels of market concentration lead banks to operate with a lower (higher) capital buffer; (ii) joint-equity banks that disclose more information to the public maintain larger capital ratios; (iii) full state ownership reduces the sensitivity of changes in a bank's capital buffer to its level of risk;(iv) banks that release more transparent financial information hold more capital against their non-performing loans. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

A research-based approach to exploring the adoption of novel UK-based concrete test methods in Chinese construction sector

As part of a UK-China science bridge project - a UK government funded initiative linking leading universities and businesses in selective partnering countries in 2009 a collaborative research programme was initiated between Queen's University and the Research Institute of High Performance Concrete (part of the Central Research Institute of Building and Construction) in Beijing.

For further details email b.magee@ulster.ac.uk