Restorative Justice and Sex Offending

This essay examines the origins and uses of restorative justice with sexual offending and the contemporary challenges and controversies surrounding this. It charts the range of ad hoc initiatives which have sought to apply a restorative form of intervention with violent or sexual offending from first time and ‘acquaintance’ rape as well as young sexual abusers to high risk sexual offenders in the form of circles of support and accountability. Such schemes are often presented as a counter to the failings of retributive forms of justice and are premised on Braithwaite’s (1989) notion of ‘reintegrative shaming’ that seek to reintegrate offenders into the community. Critics of restorative justice traditionally put forward a number of core objectives when restorative justice is applied to serious forms of offending such as sexual offending. The essay also sets out and seeks to counter these principal challenges and how they may be overcome. For the most part, however, restorative justice has failed to reach its potential as a fully fledged sentencing rationale in being applied as a mainstream response to a wide range of offending including that at the higher end of the spectrum. The essay also seeks to examine barriers to restorative justice within contemporary penal policy and to highlight some of the most controversial applications of the restorative paradigm including those related to clergy sexual abuse. It concludes by offering some thoughts on the future of restorative justice as a mainstream responses to serious forms of offending.

A Case for Humanity in the Law of Rape.

One of Irigaray’s most insistent criticisms of the operation of patriarchal law is its overwhelming focus on the protection of property at the expense of law that regulates relations between and amongst persons. This paper argues, with reference to Irigaray’s work, that the conceptual change involved in such a reorientation of law’s focus has important implications for the legal perception of the harm of rape and woman’s sexuality. The possessive paradigm operates in the law of rape by disassociating the harm of rape from its psychic and subjective impact and encouraging the ‘simple’rape/ ‘real’ rape dichotomy. In returning subjectivity to woman herself we can begin to see perhaps how the crime of rape involves a harm to woman that affects the whole of her being, and to be. Such a reading allows the law to perhaps move away from understanding rape as a violation of undifferentiated bodies to a violation of the innate ‘virginity’ of woman.

Thinking Sexual Difference Through the Law of Rape

2013 marks 10 years since the Sexual Offences Act 2003 was passed. That Act made significant changes to the law of rape which appear now to have made very little difference to reporting, prosecution or conviction rates. This article argues that the Act has failed against its own measures because it remains enmeshed within a conceptual framework of sexual indifference in which woman continues to be constructed as man’s (defective) other. This construction both constricts the frame in which women’s sexuality can be thought and distorts the harm of rape for women. It also continues woman’s historic alienation from her own nature and denies her entitlement to a becoming in line with her own sexuate identity. Using Luce Irigaray’s critical and constructive frameworks, the article seeks to imagine how law might ‘cognize’ sexual difference and thus take the preliminary steps to a juridical environment in which women can more adequately understand and articulate the harm of rape.

Rape is Different: Academic Impact Sinks to New Lows

The neo­lib­er­al­isa­tion of the uni­ver­sity could be under­min­ing dec­ades of pro­gress in com­batting rape myths

Rape Myths, Law, and Feminist Research: 'Myths About Myths?'

In an article recently published in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, the legal scholar Helen Reece argues that the prevalence and effects of rape myths have been overstated and the designation of certain beliefs and attitudes as myths is simply wrong. Feminist researchers, she argues, are engaged 'in a process of creating myths about myths' in a way that serves to close down and limit productive debate in this 'vexed' area. In this article we argue that Reece's analysis is methodologically flawed, crudely reductionist and rhetorically unyielding. We locate Reece's analysis within the wider theoretical field to show how her failure to engage with feminist literature on rape other than in the narrowest, most exclusionary terms, yields an approach which impedes rather than advances public understanding and panders to a kind of simplistic thinking which cannot begin to grapple with the complexity of the phenomenon that is rape. We conclude by emphasizing the continuing commitment of feminist researchers carefully to theorizing and (re)mapping the fraught field of progressive legal strategizing in order to identify and counter the kinds of risks and shortcomings of political activism with which Reece is rightly concerned.

Speaking Out Against Rape:Feminist (Her)Stories and Anti-Rape Politics

In 1976, Susan Brownmiller published 'Against Our Will', widely credited as the founding text of feminist anti-rape theory, in which she famously declared that rape was 'nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear'.While the scholarship and politics of Against Our Will have been subjected to numerous and compelling critiques, the work retains canonical and even foundational status within feminist anti-rape politics. In this article I attempt a critical re-examination of feminist (her)story telling practices. By situating the story told in Against Our Will beside and within Brownmiller's story of the creation of the book and her own coming-to-consciousness, a more general reexamination of the role of women's speech and (her)story-telling in feminist anti-rape politics is afforded. This re-reading draws out two central aspects of the politics of (her)story-telling which can be found in Brownmiller's work and in the Joan W. Scott quotation above. Firstly, the need to be recognised as a 'just source' of women's stories has resulted in the granting of epistemological primacy to stories of women's experience or personal statements. Secondly, the desire to compensate for the lack of a 'classical myth' to authorise women's claims, resulting in an attempt to imbue these feminist (her)stories with their own mythology.

'Not Forsworn with Pink Ribbons': Hannah More, Thomas De Quincey, and the Literature of Power

De Quincey's conception of the literature of "power" as opposed to that of "knowledge," has proved to be one of the most influential of romantic theories of literature, playing no small part in the canonization of Wordsworth. De Quincey's early acquaintance with the Lyrical Ballads was made through the Evangelical circles of his mother, who was a follower of Hannah More and a member of the Clapham sect. In later years, however, De Quincey repudiated his early Evangelical upbringing and wrote quite scathingly of the literary pretensions of Hannah More. This paper attempts to uncover the revisionary nature of De Quincey's later reminiscences of More and to indicate thereby the covert influence of Evangelical thinking on his literary theorizing. Far from absolving literature of politics, however, colonialist and nationalist imperatives typical of Evangelical thinking may be seen to operate within the spiritualized and aesthetic sphere to which literary power is arrogated by De Quincey.

How Does Justice Sound? Enunciative Modalities, Law’s Logos and Woman’s Voice

In the throes of her mimetic exposure of the lie of phallocratic discursive unity in 'Speculum of the Other Woman', Irigaray paused on the impossibility of woman’s voice and remarked that ‘it [was] still better to speak only in riddles, allusions, hints, parables.’ Even if asked to clarify a few points. Even if people plead that they just don’t understand. After all, she said, ‘they never have understood.’ (Irigaray 1985, 143).

That the law has never understood a uniquely feminine narrative is hardly controversial, but that this erasure continues to have real and substantive consequences for justice is a reality that feminists have been compelled to remain vigilant in exposing. How does the authority of the word compound law’s exclusionary matrix? How does law remain impervious to woman’s voice and how might it hear woman’s voice? Is there capacity for a dialogic engagement between woman, parler femme, and law?

This paper will explore these questions with particular reference to the experience of women testifying to trauma during the rape trial. It will argue that a logically linked historical genealogy can be traced through which law has come to posit itself as an originary discourse by which thinking is very much conflated with being, or in other terms, law is conflated with justice. This has consequences both for women’s capacity to speak or represent the harm of rape to law, but also for law’s ability to ‘hear’ woman’s voice and objectively adjudicate in cases of rape. It will suggest that justice requires law acknowledge the presence of two distinct and different subjects and that this must be done not only at the symbolic level but also at the level of the parole, syntax and discourse.