Coupling short-term (B2G model) and long-term (g-function) models for ground source heat exchanger simulation in TRNSYS. Application in a real installation

Ground-source heat pump (GSHP) systems represent one of the most promising techniques for heating and cooling in buildings. These systems use the ground as a heat source/sink, allowing a better efficiency thanks to the low variations of the ground temperature along the seasons. The ground-source heat exchanger (GSHE) then becomes a key component for optimizing the overall performance of the system. Moreover, the short-term response related to the dynamic behaviour of the GSHE is a crucial aspect, especially from a regulation criteria perspective in on/off controlled GSHP systems. In this context, a novel numerical GSHE model has been developed at the Instituto de Ingeniería Energética, Universitat Politècnica de València. Based on the decoupling of the short-term and the long-term response of the GSHE, the novel model allows the use of faster and more precise models on both sides. In particular, the short-term model considered is the B2G model, developed and validated in previous research works conducted at the Instituto de Ingeniería Energética. For the long-term, the g-function model was selected, since it is a previously validated and widely used model, and presents some interesting features that are useful for its combination with the B2G model. The aim of the present paper is to describe the procedure of combining these two models in order to obtain a unique complete GSHE model for both short- and long-term simulation. The resulting model is then validated against experimental data from a real GSHP installation.

Partial Cooperation in Location Choice: Salop’s Model with Three Firms

We consider how three firms compete in a Salop location model and how cooperation in location choice by two of these firms affects the outcomes. We con- sider the classical case of linear transportation costs as a two-stage game in which the firms select first a location on a unit circle along which consumers are dispersed evenly, followed by the competitive selection of a price. Standard analysis restricts itself to purely competitive selection of location; instead, we focus on the situation in which two firms collectively decide about location, but price their products competitively after the location choice has been effectuated. We show that such partial coordination of location is beneficial to all firms, since it reduces the number of equilibria significantly and, thereby, the resulting coordination problem. Subsequently, we show that the case of quadratic transportation costs changes the main conclusions only marginally.